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Do you think a program of this magnitude gathering information 
involving a large number of people involved with telephone companies 
could be indefinitely kept secret from the American people?” 
[Representative Robert] Goodlatte asked. 
 
“Well,” ODNI general counsel Robert S. Litt said with a slight smile, 
“we tried.”3 
 
Greater disclosure to the public is necessary to restore the American 
people’s trust that intelligence activities are not only lawful and 
important to protecting our national security, but that they are 
appropriate and proportional in light of the privacy interests at stake. 
In the long run, our ability to protect the public requires that we have 
the public’s support.4 
 
 
The two epigraphs above present the critical question at the heart of 
this paper: Why would or should we trust the Intelligence Community? As I 
lay out in the following pages, the White House, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and National Security Agency (NSA) have repeatedly lied to (at a 
minimum, misdirected) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), 
Congress, and not least the American public.  
In one of a number of op-eds and articles posted on the one-year 
anniversary of the Snowden revelation, I wrote about the possible 
puncturing of the protective bubble around the intelligence agencies and 
what needs to be done to keep it from resealing. I return to these issues at 
the end of this article. 
One year ago, on June 5, 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that he had 
provided several reporters with access to documents he had taken 
from the National Security Agency. The subsequent carefully 
researched and thoughtfully written stories blew the lid off much of the 
2
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secrecy that the National Security Agency, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence 
community had imposed on the communications surveillance in which 
our government had been engaging. 
 
A month prior to the first disclosures, in response to the advocacy 
community’s requests that the opinions of the FISC be declassified, 
Robert Litt, general counsel for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Justice Department and the FISA Court averred they 
could not and should not be declassified; that operational details were 
too completely interwoven with the legal discussions for it to be 
possible to separate them out. As a result of the disclosures, the 
intelligence community has been forced to declassify and release these 
documents and others. 
 
The PATRIOT Act in 2001 gave permission for the FBI to seek a court 
order production of records or documents - tangible things - when 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought 
is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism. 
Over the years, we learned from a disclosure made by Snowden, this 
provision was used to require companies like Verizon to “produce to 
the National Security Agency (NSA)..., and continue production on an 
ongoing daily basis thereafter..., unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, an electronic copy of: all call detail records or “telephony 
metadata” created by Verizon for communications (i) between the 
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, 
including local telephone calls. 
 
We learned through an administration White Paper (intended to calm 
the waters) that multiple FISC judges found that Section 215 
authorizes such bulk collection of metadata—not to gain access to 
specific items about specific persons on a case-by-case basis as the 
law clearly states, but, rather, because technology makes it useful to a 
“broad range of investigations of international terrorism” - which may 
or may not themselves have been authorized by the FISC. Worse yet, 
we further learned from a declassified and released 85-page ruling by 
John Bates, then serving as chief judge on the FISC, that the court 
found that its approval of a government interpretation...was “premised 
3
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on a flawed depiction” of how the program operated and “buttressed 
by repeated inaccurate statements in the government’s submissions” 
to the court. 
 
The revelations have continued to this day. As a result, legislation that 
makes major changes to bulk collection of call records passed the 
House in 20145 - although it remains possible that it, too, will be 
secretly interpreted to allow surveillance of millions of Americans. The 
director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has 
publicly accepted the need for greater transparency and taken some 
steps in that direction.  
 
The bubble that has seemed to protect the intelligence community 
from President Obama’s openness initiatives may have sprung a leak. 
It is essential that, as the debate over the USA FREEDOM Act moves to 
the Senate, Congress ensures that this leak is not resealed, and that 
future disclosures should not require anyone to take the risks Snowden 
did. Instead, they should come from declassification of FISA court 
decisions, public reports of how many people’s communications are 
being stored in the NSA’s databases, and oversight hearings that are 
open to the press and public.6 
 
 
Context and Perspective 
In order to understand the context for the “Snowden disclosures” and 
what they have meant for Executive Branch accountability, it is necessary to 
understand the course of efforts to rein in - or at least secure some (often 
minimal) oversight of - the U.S. Intelligence Community. These initiatives 
include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the amendments 
thereto, including, for the purposes of this article, the USA PATRIOT Act, the 
USA Freedom Act, and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) and its 
4
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reauthorizations. The whole story (that we know to date) is a complicated 
tale, which I try to encapsulate in this article. 
This article is not written from an academic perspective; it is the 
struggle of an engaged (non-lawyer) advocate to understand how the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated repeatedly - and outside 
of scrutiny for accountability - by the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
especially the White House, the Department of Justice, and the NSA, and the 
roles of the Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
in those violations. The experience has been akin to putting together a 
moving puzzle without an image to use as a reference (or with only a 
completely different image - such as what the statutes say) and with some 
of the pieces missing, hidden, changing shapes, or somehow deliberately 
obscured. 
An integral part of the story is the engagement of civil society - 
privacy, civil liberties, and open government organizations - in pushing back 
against the Executive Branch (including through Freedom of Information Act 
[FOIA] litigation) and in working with (and often also pushing back on) 
Congress. The output of civil society has been deeply informed and 
informative - and voluminous. For that reason, I have put as many as I 
could locate of the letters, statements to/testimony before congressional 
committees (ranging from 2002 to 2018), and commentaries (specifically on 
5
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the 2017 reauthorization FISA Amendment) on a separate website. The links 
are here.7 
The dedicated reporters, all the individuals behind the scenes, and the 
editors of numerous newspapers and news sites have been - and continue to 
be - irreplaceable guides to the documents, the context, and the analysis of 
the programs as unveiled to the public. At the end, I will try to point to some 
initiatives to keep the leak in the Intelligence Community’s bubble of secrecy 
from being resealed. It was a difficult task in an administration committed 
(at least rhetorically) to transparency; it may well prove to be Sisyphean in 
the current administration.  
It is worth noting that, as of this writing, the ODNI is continuing to 
declassify and release documents. Although these are quite often in 
response to court orders (e.g., in FOIA litigation), some seem more 
voluntary. Members of Congress have recently passed legislation to address 
some of the most egregious abridgements of constitutional protections—but 
ongoing oversight will be necessary. 
The secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court also needs reform 
and greater transparency. In the case of Congress and its responsibility for 
oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC), it needs greater substantive 
and consequential accountability to the American public. It also needs 
greater internal transparency. The basic organization of the article is: 
1. A discussion of the text and the intent of the legislation indicated at 
the beginning of each section (including a section on the extra-
6
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legislative “President’s Surveillance Program” and one on Executive 
Order 12333); the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Executive 
Order 12333; the USA PATRIOT Act; USA PATRIOT Act Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005; the President’s Surveillance 
Program8; Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Amendments Act; the USA FREEDOM Act; and the 2017 Foreign 
Surveillance Amendments Act Reauthorization; 
 
2. What has been revealed as a result of the disclosures made by Edward 
Snowden; 
 
3. How civil society and, where known, the courts and Congress used the 
revelations to enact changes in law and/or practice. 
 
 These topics are followed by discussions of the problems with 
congressional and FISA Court oversight. 
 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978  
 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was one of 
the results of a scandal that exposed a wide range of intelligence abuses by 
federal agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, and 
National Security Agency. The abuses were (and continue to be) 
constitutional; the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
 
Background 
 In 1973, the Senate Watergate Committee investigation revealed that 
the Executive Branch had directed national intelligence agencies to carry out 
constitutionally questionable domestic security operations. Following a 1974 
7
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front-page New York Times article by Seymour Hersh,9 claiming that the CIA 
had been spying on anti-war activists for more than a decade and thus 
violating the agency’s charter, former CIA officials and some lawmakers 
called for a congressional inquiry. 
According to Senate history, on January 21, 1975, Senator John 
Pastore introduced a resolution (passed by the Senate 82-4) to establish a 
select committee to investigate federal intelligence operations and determine 
“the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were 
engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.”10 Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield and Republican leader Hugh Scott carefully selected 
committee members; Mansfield selected as chairman Democrat Frank 
Church of Idaho, a sixteen-year member of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, who had co-chaired a special committee to critically examine the 
executive branch’s consolidation of power in the Cold War era. According to 
the Senate history of the commission, Church recognized the strategic value 
of the nation’s top intelligence agencies and was also mindful of the need for 
American institutions to function within the confines of US constitutional 
law.11 
The Church Committee conducted a far-reaching Senate investigation 
into U.S. intelligence agencies, and in the course of their work, investigators 
identified programs - never before known to the public - that monitored wire 
communications to and from the United States and shared some of that data 
8
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with other intelligence agencies, including NSA’s Projects SHAMROCK and 
MINARET.12 
Over a nine-month period, the committee interviewed hundreds of 
witnesses and conducted numerous hearings, ultimately producing analysis 
demonstrating that the FBI had engaged in illegal covert operations in the 
United States, and that the CIA had engaged in illegal covert operations at 
home and abroad. As Scott Boykin notes, the Committee’s reports 
demonstrated that the FBI and CIA had harassed civil rights and political 
dissident groups, opened and read individuals’ mail, and conducted 
warrantless break-ins to plant surveillance devices and steal information 
regarding the groups’ members.13,14 
In its final report, the Committee included 96 recommendations, both 
legislative and regulatory, designed “to place intelligence activities within the 
constitutional scheme for controlling government power.”15,16 The committee 
observed that “there is no inherent constitutional authority for the President 
or any intelligence agency to violate the law,” and recommended 
strengthening oversight of intelligence activities.  
 In 1976, the Senate approved Senate Resolution 400, establishing the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to provide “vigilant legislative 
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that 
such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States” [emphasis added].17,18 The Committee's reports helped prompt 
9
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significant legislative reforms, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, signed into law by President Jimmy Carter.19  
 
The FISA Court Established 
The law required the Executive Branch to request warrants for 
wiretapping and surveillance purposes from a newly formed FISA Court. 
Under the statute as adopted, the President could authorize electronic 
surveillance of foreign powers to gather intelligence upon the Attorney 
General’s certification that there was no “substantial likelihood” that the 
government would obtain the communications of a “United States person,” 
or USP, a citizen or other lawful resident of the United States,20 and that the 
minimization procedures for the surveillance protected the private 
information of USPs.21 
The newly created FISA Court could issue orders for electronic 
surveillance of foreign powers or their agents upon application by federal 
officers authorized by the Attorney General on behalf of the President. A USP 
could not be regarded as a foreign power for purposes of obtaining an order 
from the FISC for activities protected by the First Amendment. A USP could 
be an agent of a foreign power when: the person engages in clandestine 
intelligence activities on a foreign power’s behalf; such activities may involve 
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States; a person engages or 
prepares to engage in sabotage or international terrorism on behalf of a 
10
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foreign power; a person enters the United States under a false identity on 
behalf of a foreign power; or a person aids or abets or conspires to do any of 
the foregoing. Under FISA, the location of the surveillance must be a place 
that is to be used by a foreign power or its agent. The FISC order for 
surveillance had to specify the target and location, the method of conducting 
it, its duration, and the number of devices employed. The required 
minimization procedures had to meet the same requirement as for electronic 
surveillance without a court order.  
 Each of these requirements has been undermined in the ensuing 
years. 
 
The Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections 
 
In the history of the erosion of the Fourth Amendment protections 
post-FISA, it is important to note that many of the erosions undertaken by 
the Executive Branch did not have the sanction of legislation. 
 
Executive Order 1233322 
The Order, signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981, 
established broad new surveillance authorities for the intelligence community 
and governs the NSA’s signals intelligence collection abroad; it is outside the 
scope of public law.23 The Order was most recently amended on January 3, 
2017. It is discussed in detail below. 
The timing of the Order is not coincidental:  
11
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 At the time the order was written, the nation’s intelligence community 
was dealing with a shattered reputation after decades of widespread 
abuses. The Church Committee—a special congressional panel tasked 
in the 1970s with investigating intelligence abuses—had revealed CIA 
efforts to cover up the Watergate scandal, the CIA’s opening of 
Americans’ mail, and the agency’s efforts to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel 
Castro. 
Executive Order 12333 was intended to bolster a reeling intelligence 
community and further define its authority to conduct foreign 
intelligence gathering. 
The global telecommunications network didn’t exist, and collecting 
foreign communications posed little risk for Americans’ data to be 
swept up in the dragnet.24 
 
The President’s Surveillance Program 
 The Bush Administration stacked the deck before the passage of the 
PATRIOT Act. The "President's Surveillance Program" (PSP) operated in 
secrecy for approximately seven years.25   
I will return to the PSP after the discussion of the USA PATRIOT Act 
(and its Reauthorization), because while Congress and the Bush 
Administration intended the USA PATRIOT Act to strengthen the nation’s 
ability to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration 
also was convinced that it needed to avoid FISA’s requirements that it obtain 
judicial approval for surveillance activities. The PSP was its solution, and 
Executive Order 12333 (“E.O. 12333,” discussed below) was the vehicle.26 
The Program consisted of warrantless surveillance on persons the Bush 
administration suspected might be involved in terrorist activities. Beginning 
in 2001, the government intercepted international phone calls, and the 
12
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NSA’s STELLARWIND program mined information from email databases and 
gathered telephone metadata from the databases of cellphone service 
providers.27,28 The NSA also gathered and analyzed the content of telephone 
conversations and email communications from these databases and, from 
the beginning of the PSP through January 2007, eight percent of the 
communications analyzed were those of USPs. The PSP was the first post-
200129 example of the focus of this article: Warrantless Surveillance Under 
and Around the Law - in this case, completely around. President Bush did 
not ask Congress to include provisions for the NSA domestic surveillance 
program as part of the USA PATRIOT Act and did not seek any other laws to 
authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that such new 
laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the Congressional 
resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization. 
The program was initially based on the executive’s “inherent power” to 
gather foreign intelligence. After internal dissent, an additional rationale was 
added: Congress’s resolution authorizing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
included the implicit authority to capture communications related to those 
areas.30,31 
Even though the Program started before the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act, it is important to first understand what that law, enacted by Congress, 
permitted the Department of Justice and the NSA to do in terms of 
collecting, mining, and analyzing the communication records of USPs, and 
13
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what the public and much of Congress believed were the limitations on the 
government’s surveillance.32 First, though, I begin with Executive Order 
12333, as it is behind the bulk and warrantless surveillance occurring since 
its inception, but little discussed. After that discussion, I go to the first 
legislative amendments to the FISA: the USA PATRIOT Act. 
 
Issuance and Effects of Executive Order 12333 
The NSA’s collection of information on Americans’ cellphone and 
Internet usage reaches far beyond the two programs that have received 
public attention (PRISM33 and “Upstream”), to a presidential order “that is 
older than the Internet itself.”34,35 
Indeed, documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden 
suggest that less than half of the metadata the NSA has collected has been 
acquired under provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and FISA, the two laws 
that have received the most attention for permitting NSA programs: “Gen. 
Keith Alexander, the (then) NSA director, has ratified that impression, saying 
that the majority of NSA data is collected ‘solely pursuant to the authorities 
provided by Executive Order 12333.’”36 
Executive Order 12333,37 approved by President Ronald Reagan in 
1981, to this day governs most of what the NSA does, outlines the duties 
and foreign intelligence collection for the nation’s 17 intelligence agencies, 
14
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and remains the primary authority under which the country’s intelligence 
agencies conduct the majority of their operations.38  
Under its provisions, agencies have the ability to function outside the 
confines of a warrant or court order, if approved by the attorney general. Its 
Section 2.5 effectively gives the attorney general the right to authorize 
intelligence agencies to operate outside the confines of judicial or 
congressional oversight, so long as it is in pursuit of foreign intelligence— 
including collecting information of Americans: “The Attorney General hereby 
is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within 
the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique 
for which a warrant would be required.”39 
Monitoring the actual content of Americans’ communications still 
requires a warrant, but metadata - the hidden information about a 
communication that tells where a person is, with whom he’s communicating, 
even the number of credit cards used in a transaction - can be swept up 
without congressional or court approval. The Order is not governed by 
Congress, and what changes have been made to it have come through 
guidelines set by the Attorney General or other documents.40 The result is a 
“web of intelligence law so complicated that it stymies even those tasked 
with interpreting it. As one former executive official said, ‘It’s complicated 
stuff.’”41  
 
15
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Outdated Agency Guidelines Do Not Protect Metadata 
Intelligence officials have said that each agency’s respective 12333 
collection is governed by supplemental guidelines written by the attorney 
general, and that those guidelines protect Americans’ data. They admitted in 
2013, however, that most of those guidelines had not been revisited in 
decades, and that they don’t offer the same protections as the metadata 
collection programs authorized under the PATRIOT Act and FISA. At that 
time, they wrote: 
NSA uses EO 12333 authority to collect foreign intelligence from 
communications systems around the world. Due to the fragility of 
these sources, providing any significant detail outside of classified 
channels is damaging to national security. Nonetheless, every type of 
collection undergoes a strict oversight and compliance process internal 
to NSA that is conducted by entities within NSA other than those 
responsible for the actual collection. 
NSA has an internal oversight and compliance framework to provide 
assurance that NSA's activities - its people, its technology, and its 
operations - act consistently with the law and with NSA and U.S. 
intelligence community policies and procedures. This framework is 
overseen by multiple organizations external to NSA, including the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Congress, 
and for activities regulated by FISA, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.42 
 
 As noted, neither the regular federal courts nor the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is tasked with approving some forms 
of surveillance, provide meaningful or accountable oversight of EO 12333 
activities. The FISC is required to authorize and oversee collection activities 
conducted pursuant to FISA, to assess sufficiency of IC foreign intelligence 
16
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procedures, and to receive compliance reports from the IC concerning only 
violations of FISA, not other violations of the 4th Amendment by the IC.43 
 
Lack of Protections and Bulk Data Collection 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, then-chair of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, noted that the Order has few, if any, privacy protections: “I 
don’t think privacy protections are built into it. It’s an executive policy. The 
executive controls intelligence in the country.”44 
To this point, it is important to note (as is done below in the 
discussions of legislation) that bulk data collection that occurs inside the 
United States must be authorized by statute, has some protections of the 
privacy of USPs, and is subject to oversight from Congress and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court. Executive Order 12333, however, contains 
no such protections for USPs if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders; it 
authorizes collection of the content of communications, not just metadata, 
even for USPs.45,46 Although such persons cannot be individually targeted 
under 12333 without a court order, if the contents of a USP’s 
communications are “incidentally” collected (an NSA term of art) in the 
course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation, then Section 
2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It does not 
require that the affected USPs be suspected of wrongdoing and places no 
17
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limits on the volume of communications by USPs that may be collected and 
retained.47 
We do know a little about the spying conducted using EO 12333. In 
November 2013, a Washington Post report revealed EO 12333 was the 
NSA's claimed authority for the collection of Americans' address books and 
buddy lists - as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) put it, the NSA has 
been siphoning off data from the links between Yahoo! and Google data 
centers, which include the fiber optic connections between company servers 
at various points around the world. As noted above, the NSA has not been 
authorized by Congress or the FISC to collect contact lists in bulk, and senior 
intelligence officials said it would be illegal to do so from facilities in the 
United States.48,49,50,51  
One official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the 
classified program, said the agency avoids the restrictions in the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by intercepting contact lists from 
access points “all over the world. None of those are on U.S. territory.” 
Because of the method employed—when information passes through 
“the overseas collection apparatus,” the official added, “the 
assumption is you’re not a U.S. person”—the agency is not legally 
required or technically able to restrict its intake to contact lists 
belonging to specified foreign intelligence targets, he said.  
 
A senior U.S. intelligence official told the Post that the privacy of 
Americans is protected, despite mass collection, because “we have checks 
and balances built into our tools.”52 
The most recent change to the Order came from President Barack 
Obama in the final days of his administration. The new rules let the NSA 
18
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share the raw streams of communications it intercepts directly with agencies 
including the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security. 
According to Robert S. Litt, the then-general counsel to the Director of 
ODNI, “This is not expanding the substantive ability of law enforcement to 
get access to signals intelligence. It is simply widening the aperture for a 
larger number of analysts, who will be bound by the existing rules.”53 
And they have checks and balances built into their tools. 
 
The USA PATRIOT Act 
Less than a week after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
legislative proposals to strengthen the nation’s ability to combat terrorism 
after the attacks and to give broad new powers to the Executive Branch - 
with relatively little oversight from the courts - were introduced. President 
Bush signed the final bill, the USA PATRIOT54 Act (Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56),55 into law on October 26, 2001. 
Although the Act made significant amendments to more than 15 important 
statutes - in particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA)56 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)57 - it 
was introduced with great haste and passed with little debate, and without a 
House, Senate, or conference report.58 The Act thus lacks background 
legislative history that often retrospectively provides the necessary material 
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to guide statutory interpretation. 
 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
 Title II of the PATRIOT Act made a number of significant changes to 
the laws relating to foreign intelligence surveillance, appreciably expanding 
government investigative authority. Specifically, Section 215 substantially 
revised the authority under the FISA.59 It amended Title V of the FISA by 
striking sections 501 through 503 of that act and inserting - as Section 215 -
the following: SEC. 501, Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign 
Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations, discussed below; and 
SEC. 502 on Congressional Oversight.60 
• What Kind of Records? Under the (unamended) FISA, the FISA Court 
(FISC) could issue orders for electronic surveillance of foreign powers 
or their agents. Section 215 broadened the government’s authority by 
eliminating any limitation on the types records that may be seized: 
(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a 
designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge61) may make an application for an order 
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to 
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities. 
 
• With What Authorization? Under the FISA,62 a judge having 
jurisdiction63 could issue orders for electronic surveillance of foreign 
powers or their agents upon application by federal officers authorized 
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by the Attorney General on behalf of the President, upon the Attorney 
General’s certification that there was no “substantial likelihood” that 
the government would obtain the communications of a USP (a citizen 
or other lawful resident of the United States), and that the private 
information of USPs was protected by the minimization procedures for 
the surveillance.  
Section 215 shifts the authorization from the Attorney General to the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the 
Director (of a rank no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge). 
• For Whose Records? Under the FISA, a USP could not be regarded as a 
foreign power for purposes of obtaining an order from the FISC for 
activities protected by the First Amendment. 
Section 215 states that an investigation conducted under this section 
should be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and not 
“be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.” 
The incorporation of Section 501 of the FISA into Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act permitted the FBI to apply to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) for an order to seize business records of 
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hotels, motels, car and truck rental agencies, and storage rental 
facilities.  
• For What Purposes? Under the FISA, an application for an order 
allowing electronic surveillance required a statement of a federal 
officer under oath attesting to the identity or description of a proposed 
target for surveillance, a statement of the “facts and circumstances” 
showing that the target is “being used or is about to be used” by “a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” a description of the 
communications sought and the types of communications being 
sought, and “that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information” that cannot be obtained by ordinary 
intelligence-gathering techniques [emphasis added]. 
 “Foreign intelligence information” in the FISA (unamended) is limited 
to that needed to protect the United States against hostile acts, terrorism, or 
intelligence operations directed against the United States by a foreign power 
or its agent. A judge must find that there is probable cause showing that the 
target of the surveillance is a foreign power or its agent, and that the 
facilities targeted are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power 
or its agent.64 
 As noted earlier, under the FISA, the location of the surveillance must 
be a place that is to be used by a foreign power or its agent. The FISC order 
for surveillance had to specify the target and location, the method of 
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conducting it, its duration, and the number of devices employed. The 
minimization procedures had to meet the same requirement as for electronic 
surveillance without a court order. 
Section 215 only required the government to assert that the records or 
other things are ”sought for an authorized investigation conducted in 
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information 
not concerning a United States person or to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”65 The terms “foreign 
intelligence information” and “international terrorism” are undefined. There 
is no requirement for an evidentiary or factual showing and the judge has 
little discretion in reviewing an application, nor is there the limitation on 
place. 
 
Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
 Section 505 allowed the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) when 
seeking information "relevant" in authorized national security investigations 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities. A National Security Letter is a type of administrative subpoena: a 
written demand from the FBI that compels Internet service providers (ISPs), 
credit companies, financial institutions, and others to hand over confidential 
records of their customers, including, but not limited to, subscriber 
information, phone numbers and email addresses, and websites visited. The 
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recipient of the order may not disclose the fact that the FBI has sought or 
obtained records.66  
• Who authorizes such Letters? As long as the head of an FBI field office 
certifies that the records would be relevant to a counterterrorism 
investigation, the Bureau can send a National Security Letter request 
without the approval of a judge or grand jury - it is not a warrant.  
 The USA PATRIOT Act was modified by the USA PATRIOT Act 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (immediately below) and the 
USA FREEDOM Act (discussed later). 
 
 
USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
The American Library Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and many others were engaged over a 
number of years in pushing in public and in Congress for changes to the USA 
PATRIOT Act to protect privacy and civil liberties.67 The reauthorizing 
legislation addressed a number of concerns of the privacy and civil liberties 
communities. 
Section 215 orders: 
 
• A Section 215 order cannot be issued unless the information sought is 
relevant to (rather than just “sought for”) an authorized national 
security investigation (other than a threat assessment).  
 
• The FISA court is allowed to issue a section 215 order for certain more 
sensitive categories of documents—such as library, bookstore, 
medical, tax return, and gun sale records. The application must be 
signed by either the Director or Deputy Director of the FBI (rather than 
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a designee of the Director (of a rank no lower than Assistant Special 
Agent in Charge). 
 
• It requires the Attorney General to develop and apply "minimization 
procedures" limiting the retention and dissemination of information 
concerning USPs obtained through section 215 orders - thus restoring 
a requirement under the original FISA. 
 
• It allows explicit judicial review of NSLs and any accompanying 
nondisclosure orders, and provides that nondisclosure orders no longer 
automatically attach to NSL requests. 
 
• It clarifies that a recipient may disclose receipt of an NSL to those 
necessary to comply with it, or to an attorney in order to obtain legal 
advice or assistance with respect to it. 
 
• It explicitly allows recipients to seek judicial review, to disclose receipt 
of a 215 order to attorneys in order to obtain legal advice or 
assistance, and to other people necessary to comply with the request. 
 
Section 206 roving surveillance orders: This Section allows the FISC to 
issue an electronic surveillance order that attaches to a particular target, 
rather than to a particular phone or computer. It clarifies the level of detail 
necessary to obtain a section 206 order, particularly where the target is 
identified by a description rather than by name.68 
Sunsetted Provisions: The reauthorizing legislation made permanent 
14 of the 16 sunsetted USA PATRIOT Act provisions. It placed four-year 
sunsets on the other two - the authority to conduct "roving" surveillance 
under the FISA; and the authority to request production of business records 
under FISA (USA PATRIOT Act sections 206 and 215, respectively).69 
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What We Learned as a Result of the Snowden Documents70 
The Scope of Collection under Section 215 
• FISA Court Order to Verizon to provide a broad data collection: On 
June 5, 2013, we learned that Verizon (and others) were required to 
indiscriminately provide all71 domestic call detail records to the NSA 
under an April 25, 2013 court-order.72 This requirement was made 
under the auspices of Section 215, which, as written, did not authorize 
such an unspecific collection. 
There was a veiled indication of this use of Section 215 in 2011 when 
the acting head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division 
Todd Hinnen testified that “some orders have also been used to 
support important and highly sensitive intelligence collection 
operations, on which this committee and others have been separately 
briefed.73 On average, we seek and obtain section 215 orders less than 
40 times per year.” I return to this testimony below. 
How did we get from the Section 215 statutory language “tangible 
things” (as normally understood) relevant to an authorized 
investigation of international terrorism, to the language from the Court 
Order below? 
[T]he Custodian of Records shall produce to the National Security 
Agency (NSA) upon service of this Order, and continue production on 
an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this Order, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following 
tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony metadata" created 
by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and 
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abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls. 
 
Before Snowden provided journalists with the FISC order to Verizon, it 
was assumed (with some suspicion) by the civil liberties community 
(and many in the media) that Section 215 was being used in discrete 
requests to obtain individual collections of records about known 
counterintelligence or terrorist suspects - “for records showing, say, 
that a certain person made certain purchases from a certain vendor or 
used a particular telephone to make specific calls”74 [emphasis added]. 
• FBI Director Mueller’s Response re “increase in the volume of business 
records requests”: In a 2011 response (apparently to a congressional 
Questions for the Record), then-FBI Director Mueller indicated that, 
beginning in late 2009, certain electronic communications service 
providers no longer honored National Security Letters (under Section 
505) to obtain records because of what their lawyers cited as “an 
ambiguity” in the law.75 As a result, Mueller said, the FBI had switched 
over to demanding the same “business records” data under Section 
215.  
According to Mueller, “This change accounts for a significant increase 
in the volume of business records requests.” As noted above, however, 
Todd Hinnen’s 2011 testimony suggested that these orders were 
comparatively rare: “we seek and obtain section 215 orders less than 
40 times per year.”76 
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Before Snowden, the public was prevented from knowing that behind 
the small number (212 requests in 2012) of Section 215 requests, 
applications to the FISC “for access to certain business records 
(including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence 
purposes” were the massive numbers involved in the bulk collections 
of metadata on calls “wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls.” 
 
Administration White Paper 
Through the August 2013 Administration White Paper77, we learned 
that multiple FISC judges - beginning in 2006 - found that Section 215 
authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk.78 According to the 
Administration, the FISC judges considered that the telephony metadata 
collection program meets the “relevance” standard of Section 215 because 
there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when 
queried and analyzed consistent with the Court-approved standards,79 will 
produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international 
terrorism, because  
certain analytic tools used to accomplish this objective require the 
collection and storage of a large volume of telephony metadata [and] 
… communications metadata is different from many other kinds of 
records because it is inter-connected and the connections between 
individual data points, which can be reliably identified only through 
analysis of a large volume of data, are particularly important to a 
broad range of investigations of international terrorism [emphasis 
added].80 
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 So, the FBI and the NSA were authorized to get this information, not in 
order to gain access to specific items about specific persons on a case-by-
case basis, but, rather, because technology makes it useful to a “broad 
range of investigations of international terrorism” - which may or may not 
themselves have been authorized by the FISC.  
• New NSA Term “hops”: In 2013, a new term, “hops,” was added to our 
vocabulary. In his testimony81 before the House Judiciary Committee82 
NSA Deputy Director John Chris Inglis stated that the FISA court "has 
approved us to go out two or three hops" - or, as we now know, to 
“contact chain.”83 The Washington Post explained: 
When analysts think they have cause to suspect an individual, they will 
look at everyone that person has contacted, called the first hop away 
from the target. Then, in a series of exponential ripples, they look at 
everyone all those secondary people communicated with. And from 
that pool, they look at everyone those tertiary people contacted. This 
is called a second and a third hop.84 
 
As members of the committee were quick to point out at the time, this 
is not what the law, as passed by Congress, allows.85 Indeed, at this 
hearing, Representative Jerrold Nadler told Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole, "The statute says 'collection.' You're trying to confuse us 
by talking use."86  
And indeed, it seems that the DOJ officials were trying to do just that. 
Inglis and Cole actually were referring to a 2007 Justice Department 
memo87 (discussed below under President’s Surveillance Program), in 
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which the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General 
approval pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed 
amendment to “procedures governing the National Security Agency's 
Signals Intelligence Activities.”88 
The NSA was quite willing to misdirect the FISC as well as Congress. 
As we will see below (in the President’s Surveillance Program section), in a 
discussion of Judge Bates’ Opinion - also declassified as a result of the 
Snowden disclosures - the FISC approval of contact chaining (hops) was 
sought under the various permutations of the President’s/Terrorist 
Surveillance Program.89  
  
FISA Court Documents Detailing the Court’s Interpretation of Section 
215 
In September 2013, in response to a court order in a 2011 EFF lawsuit 
(see below under President’s Surveillance Program, Civil Society 
Engagement), the government released hundreds of pages of previously 
secret FISA documents detailing the court’s interpretation of Section 215, 
including an opinion excoriating the NSA for misusing its mass surveillance 
database for years (see below).90 
  
Civil Society Engagement 
The American Library Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and many others were engaged over a 
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number of years in pushing - in public and in Congress - for changes to the 
USA PATRIOT Act to protect privacy and civil liberties.91 These efforts came 
to some fruition in the 2005 Amendments (see above). 
On October 26, 2011, EFF sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) for 
answers about “secret interpretations” of a controversial section of the law.92 
On June 11, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil 
Liberties Union filed a challenge (ACLU v. Clapper) with the FISC, requesting 
that it publish its opinions on the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of 
Section 215.93,94 The organization filed its motion after Guardian disclosed 
(based on Snowden-provided documents) a secret FISC order (regarding 
Verizon) - issued under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act - authorizing the 
bulk collection of Americans’ call records.95 
In September 2013, in response to a court order in the lawsuit, the 
government released hundreds of pages of previously secret FISA 
documents detailing the court’s interpretation of Section 215, noted above.96 
In October 2013, the government released a second batch of documents 
related to Section 215, which showed, among other things, that the NSA had 
collected cell site locations without notifying its oversight committees in 
Congress or the FISA court.97 
 In November 2013, the ACLU and the Yale Law School’s Media 
Freedom and Information Access (MFIA) clinic filed a second motion, seeking 
to uncover the legal underpinnings of the government’s bulk collection of 
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Americans’ data more broadly.98,99 
 
What Has Occurred Since?  
 Bulk Collection under Section 215 Ruled Illegal: On May 7, 2015, in a 
97-page ruling, ACLU v. Clapper, a three-judge panel (Gerald E. Lynch, 
Robert D. Stack, and Vernon S. Broderick) of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held, on May 7, 2015, that Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act cannot be legitimately interpreted to allow the bulk 
collection of domestic calling records.100 This ruling was the first time a 
higher-level court in the regular judicial system (i.e., not the FISC) reviewed 
the NSA phone records program.101 
 In the unanimous ruling written by Judge Gerard E. Lynch, the court 
held that Section 215 “cannot bear the weight the government asks us to 
assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone metadata 
program.”102 In declaring the program illegal, the court said, “We do so 
comfortably in the full understanding that if Congress chooses to authorize 
such a far-reaching and unprecedented program, it has every opportunity to 
do so, and to do so unambiguously.”103 
 The ruling raised the question of whether Section 215, extended or 
not, has ever legitimately authorized the program.104 The court said that the 
statute on its face permits only the collection of records deemed “relevant” 
to a national security case. Judge Lynch wrote:  
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Such expansive development of government repositories of formerly 
private records would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy 
expectations of all Americans. Perhaps such a contraction is required 
by national security needs in the face of the dangers of contemporary 
domestic and international terrorism. But we would expect such a 
momentous decision to be preceded by substantial debate, and 
expressed in unmistakable language.105 
 
 As discussed below, under the President’s Surveillance Program, the 
data collection had repeatedly been approved in secret by judges serving on 
the FISC. Those judges heard arguments only from the government, and 
they accepted the interpretation of Section 215 now rejected by the appeals 
court.106 
• Renewal of Non-Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act: Three 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act that must be renewed periodically 
expired on June 1, 2015. With the passage of the USA Freedom Act 
(USAF) (discussed below) on June 2, 2015, these provisions were 
extended for four years: roving wiretaps (authorized for sometimes 
unnamed targets who communicate with multiple devices rather than 
a communications line or device); court-ordered searches of business 
records; and surveillance of non-American “lone wolf” suspects without 
confirmed ties to terrorist groups.107 
The USAF also blocks the government from transferring mass phone 
record collection, such as national security letter statutes or Section 
214 of the PATRIOT Act, to other authorities.108 
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President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) 
 
The PSP was the first post-2001 example of the focus of this article: 
Warrantless Surveillance Under and Around the Law - in this case, 
completely around.109 As noted earlier, while Congress and the Bush 
Administration intended the USA PATRIOT Act to strengthen the nation’s 
ability to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration 
also was convinced that it needed to avoid FISA’s requirements that it obtain 
judicial approval for surveillance activities. The PSP was its solution, and 
E.O. 12333 was the vehicle.110 President Bush did not ask Congress to 
include provisions for the NSA domestic surveillance program as part of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and did not seek any other laws to authorize the 
operation.  
 On 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a 
memorandum entitled Authorization For Specified Electronic Surveillance 
Activities During A Limited Period To Detect And Prevent Acts Of Terrorism 
Within The United States. The Presidential authorization delegated authority 
to the Secretary of Defense, who further delegated it to the Director of 
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS) 
to conduct specified electronic surveillance on targets related to Afghanistan 
and international terrorism for 30 days. Because the surveillance included 
wire and cable communications carried out into or out of the United States, 
it would otherwise have required FISC authority [emphasis added].111 
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 Operating Outside the Law 
Although the Authorization document may seem somewhat limited, it 
metastasized into the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), known 
publicly - after two New York Times stories exposed it in December 2005 - 
as the Terrorist Surveillance Program.112,113 It operated literally “around” and 
outside congressionally passed law discussed in this article (although the 
FISA Court and, at some point, some parts of Congress became aware of 
it).114 The Authorization highlights the intent of the Bush Administration to 
operate surveillance activities inside the United States, which had been 
barred by law and agency policy for decades, and to do so outside the 
context of warrants and, thus, of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
 Within the Bush administration, Department of Justice lawyers argued 
that new laws were unnecessary; they believed that the congressional 
resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization.  
The program was initially based on the executive’s “inherent power” to 
gather foreign intelligence. After internal dissent, an additional rationale was 
added: Congress’s resolution authorizing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
included the implicit authority to capture communications related to those 
areas.115 
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Warrantless Surveillance and STELLARWIND 
STELLARWIND consisted of warrantless surveillance on persons the 
Bush administration suspected might be involved in terrorist activities. 
Beginning in 2001, the government intercepted international phone calls, 
and the NSA’s STELLARWIND program mined information from email 
databases and gathered telephone metadata from the databases of 
cellphone service providers.116,117 The NSA also gathered and analyzed the 
content of telephone conversations and email communications from these 
databases and, from the beginning of the PSP through January 2007, eight 
percent of the communications analyzed were those of USPs. 
 According to a 2009 Report prepared by the Inspectors General of the 
involved agencies (discussed in detail below), the NSA cited authorization for 
the President’s Surveillance Program under E.O. 12333: 
For more than a decade before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 ... NSA was authorized by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United 
States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended, to 
collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT information 
for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes ... In 
September 2001, NSA’s compliance procedures defined foreign 
communications as communications having at least one communicant 
outside the United States, communications entirely among foreign 
powers, or communications between a foreign power and officers or 
employees of a foreign power. All other communications were 
considered domestic communications. NSA was not authorized under 
E.O. 12333 to collect communications from a wire in the United States 
without a court order unless the communications originated and 
terminated outside the United States or met applicable exceptions to 
the requirement of a court order under FISA.118  
 
In late September, [Michael] Hayden informed [George] Tenet119 that 
he had expanded SIGINT120 operations under E.O. 12333 authority. 
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According to Hayden, Tenet later said that he had explained the NSA's 
expanded SIGINT operations to Vice President Cheney during a 
meeting at the White House. On 2 October 2001, Hayden briefed the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on his decision to 
expand operations under E.O. 12333 and informed members of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by telephone. 
According to Hayden, Tenet told him that during the meeting the Vice 
President asked if the IC was doing everything possible to prevent 
another attack. The Vice President specifically asked Tenet if NSA 
could do more...Hayden told Tenet that nothing more could be done 
within existing authorities. In a follow-up telephone conversation, 
Tenet asked Hayden what the NSA could do if it was provided 
additional authorities. To formulate a response, Hayden met with NSA 
personnel, who were already working to fill intelligence gaps, to 
identify additional authorities to support SIGINT collection activities 
that would be operationally useful and technically feasible. In 
particular, discussions focused on how NSA might bridge the 
“international gap,” i.e., collection of international communications in 
which one communicant was within the United States.... 
 
After consulting with NSA personnel, he discussed with the White 
House how FISA constrained NSA collection of communications earned 
on a wire in the United States. Hayden explained that NSA could not 
collect from a wire in the United States, without a court order, content 
or metadata from communications that originated and/or terminated in 
the United States. Hayden also said that communications metadata do 
not have the same level of constitutional protection as the content of 
communications and that access to metadata concerning 
communications having one end in the United States would 
significantly enhance NSA’s analytic capabilities. Hayden suggested 
that the ability to collect communications that originated or terminated 
in the United States without a court order would increase NSA’s speed 
and agility. After two additional meetings with Vice President Cheney 
to discuss further how NSA collection capabilities could be expanded 
along the lines described at the White House meeting, the Vice 
President told Hayden to work out a solution with Counsel to the Vice 
President David Addington [emphasis added].121  
 
Inspectors General Report on PSP Required by Congress 
Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act)- signed into law on July 
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10, 2008 - required the Inspectors General of Intelligence Community 
agencies that participated in the PSP (the Inspectors General [IGs] of the 
DoD, DOJ, CIA, NSA, and ODNI; collectively, the "PSP IG Group") to conduct 
a comprehensive review of the program. 
• Why Did Congress Require the Report? Before going on to some of the 
findings of unclassified partial version of the Report, it is worth 
remembering how Congress came to know (at least most of Congress 
and at least publicly) about the very secret President’s Surveillance 
Program (or, after it was publicly exposed, the “Terrorist Surveillance 
Program”). The depth charges were two December 16, 2005 stories in 
the New York Times.122,123 
According to the Times, administration officials told the authors that 
the administration had briefed Congressional leaders about the 
program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. (See discussion of the briefings in the June 15, 
2013, Washington Post story below.) According to the Times, 
government officials indicated that “over the past three years”124 in an 
effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda,” the NSA 
had monitored without warrants the international telephone calls and 
international e-mail messages of hundreds - perhaps thousands - of 
people inside the United States [emphasis added]. The Agency, 
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according to these officials, still sought warrants to monitor entirely 
domestic communications. 
As the Times noted, this previously undisclosed decision to permit 
some warrantless eavesdropping inside the country without court 
approval was a major shift in American intelligence-gathering 
practices, particularly for the NSA, whose mission is to spy on 
communications abroad. As a result, according to the authors, some 
officials familiar with the continuing operation questioned whether the 
surveillance had stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on legal 
searches: A former senior official who specializes in national security 
law said, "This is really a sea change. It's almost a mainstay of this 
country that the NSA only does foreign searches."125 
One week later, Risen and Lichtblau revealed that the NSA had also 
been capturing American communications on a much broader scale by 
"tapping directly into some of the American telecommunication system's 
main arteries" with the cooperation of U.S. telecommunications 
companies.126 As discussed below (under the discussion of Section 702), in 
2013 (as a result of the Snowden revelations), the former was revealed as 
Upstream, and the latter was revealed as PRISM. 
After the New York Times stories, President Bush admitted to a small 
aspect of the program - the monitoring of the communications of between 
500 and 1000 people inside the United States with suspected connections to 
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Al Qaeda. As the EFF has detailed,127 however, “other aspects of the 
Program were aimed not just at targeted individuals, but perhaps millions of 
innocent Americans never suspected of a crime.”128 
After a public outcry, the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" was 
technically terminated in 2007. The FISA Court and Congress ultimately 
ratified the program, however, and Congress amended FISA in 2007 (the 
Protect America Act) and 2008 (the FISA Amendments Act [FAA]) to grant 
the agency even broader data-gathering powers, under Section 702 
(discussed below).129 
 
Two Versions: Unclassified and Partial, Declassified and Full130 
The 43-page unclassified review report was released on July 10, 2009. 
As the New York Times reported at the time, however, “The bulk of the 
findings remain classified in separate reports from each of the five inspectors 
general, who represent the Justice Department, the N.S.A, the C.I.A., the 
Defense Department and the Office of National Intelligence.”131 
According to the unclassified version of the IGs’ Report: 
The President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of new, 
highly classified intelligence activities. All of these activities were 
authorized in a single Presidential Authorization that was periodically 
reauthorized. The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by 
the Presidential Authorizations remain highly classified, except that 
beginning in December 2005 the President and other Administration 
officials acknowledged that these activities included the interception 
without a court order132 of certain international communications where 
there is "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the 
communication is a member of al-Qa'ida, affiliated with al-Qa'ida, or a 
member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida." The President and 
other Administration officials referred to this publicly disclosed activity 
as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program," a convention we follow in this 
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unclassified report. We refer to other intelligence activities authorized 
under the Presidential Authorizations as the "Other Intelligence 
Activities.133 
The specific details of the Other Intelligence Activities remain highly 
classified, although the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the 
existence of such activities in August 2007.134 Together, the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program and the Other Intelligence Activities comprise the PSP. 
The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately 
every 45 days.… [W]ith each reauthorization the CIA and later the NCTC 
prepared an assessment of current potential terrorist threats and a 
summary of intelligence gathered through the PSP and other means 
during the previous authorization period.… Each of the Presidential 
Authorizations included a finding to the effect that an extraordinary 
emergency continued to exist, and that the circumstances "constitute an 
urgent and compelling governmental interest" justifying the activities 
being authorized without a court order. 
Although there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be 
certified by the Attorney General or other Department of Justice official, 
current and former DOJ officials told us that this certification added value by 
giving the program a sense of legitimacy. Former Attorney General Gonzales 
stated that the NSA was being asked to do something it had not done 
before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General 
had approved the legality of the program. He also stated that it was 
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important that the cooperating private sector personnel know that the 
Attorney General had approved the program. In addition, Gonzales said that 
for "purely political considerations" the Attorney General's approval of the 
program would have value "prospectively" in the event of congressional or 
inspector general reviews of the program [emphasis added].135  
 Attorney General Ashcroft gave his legal authorization to the program 
for the first two and a half years based on a “misimpression” of what 
activities the NSA was actually conducting.136 In March 2004, a showdown 
occurred in Mr. Ashcroft’s hospital room when top Justice Department 
officials refused to sign off on the legality of the program and threatened to 
resign. The report said that the White House had the program continue by 
having Mr. Gonzales, then the White House counsel, sign the authorization 
[emphasis added].137  
The 747-page fully declassified138 version was released on April 24, 
2015, in response to a FOIA lawsuit brought by the New York Times.139 The 
declassified version includes information about the Stellarwind (the code 
name for the President’s Surveillance Program140) program: the NSA mining 
of information from email databases and gathered telephone metadata from 
the databases of cellphone service providers; and its gathering and analysis 
of the content of telephone conversations and email communications from 
these databases. 
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What We Learned as a Result of the Snowden Documents  
 A June 15, 2013 article in The Washington Post provides a good 
summary of some of what we learned from the Snowden documents. 
Primary among these is that ”STELLARWIND was succeeded by four major 
lines of intelligence collection in the territorial United States, together 
capable of spanning the full range of modern telecommunications, according 
to the interviews and documents”141: 
Two of the four collection programs, one each for telephony and the 
Internet, process trillions of “metadata” records for storage and 
analysis in systems called MAINWAY and MARINA, respectively. 
Metadata includes highly revealing information about the times, 
places, devices and participants in electronic communication, but not 
its contents. The bulk collection of telephone call records from Verizon 
Business Services, disclosed this month by the British newspaper 
Guardian, is one source of raw intelligence for MAINWAY. 
The other two types of collection, which operate on a much smaller 
scale, are aimed at content. One of them intercepts telephone calls 
and routes the spoken words to a system called NUCLEON. 
For Internet content, the most important source collection is the 
PRISM project reported on June 6 by The Washington Post and 
Guardian. It draws from data held by Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and 
other Silicon Valley giants, collectively the richest depositories of 
personal information in history. 
 
The article continued to give historical context to these disclosures: 
In the urgent aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, with more attacks thought 
to be imminent, analysts wanted to use “contact chaining” techniques 
to build what the NSA describes as network graphs of people who 
represented potential threats. 
The legal challenge for the NSA was that its practice of collecting high 
volumes of data from digital links did not seem to meet even the 
relatively low requirements of Bush’s authorization, which allowed 
collection of Internet metadata “for communications with at least one 
communicant outside the United States or for which no communicant 
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was known to be a citizen of the United States,” the NSA inspector 
general’s report said.142 
Lawyers for the agency came up with an interpretation that said the 
NSA did not “acquire” the communications, a term with formal 
meaning in surveillance law, until analysts ran searches against it. The 
NSA could “obtain” metadata in bulk, they argued, without meeting 
the required standards for acquisition. [Jack] Goldsmith and [James] 
Comey did not buy that argument, and a high-ranking U.S. intelligence 
official said the NSA does not rely on it today, saying that as soon as 
surveillance data “touches us, we’ve got it, whatever verbs you choose 
to use. We’re not saying there’s a magic formula that lets us have it 
without having it.” 
When Comey finally ordered a stop to the program, Bush signed an 
order renewing it anyway. Comey, Goldsmith, FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller III and most of the senior Bush appointees in the Justice 
Department began drafting letters of resignation. Then-NSA Director 
Michael V. Hayden was not among them.  
According to the inspector general’s classified report, Cheney’s lawyer, 
[David] Addington, placed a phone call and “General Hayden had to 
decide whether NSA would execute the Authorization without the 
Attorney General’s signature.” He decided to go along. 
The following morning, when Mueller told Bush that he and Comey 
intended to resign, the president reversed himself. 
Three months later, on July 15, [2004,] the secret surveillance court 
allowed the NSA to resume bulk collection under the court’s own 
authority. The opinion, which remains highly classified, was based on a 
provision of electronic surveillance law, known as “pen register, trap 
and trace,” that was written to allow law enforcement officers to obtain 
the phone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls from a single 
telephone line.… 
As for bulk collection of Internet metadata, the question that triggered 
the crisis of 2004, another official said the NSA is no longer doing it. 
When pressed on that question, he said he was speaking only of 
collections under authority of the surveillance court.143 
“I’m not going to say we’re not collecting any Internet metadata,” he 
added. “We’re not using this program and these kinds of accesses to 
collect Internet metadata in bulk” [emphases added].144  
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 We will see, in the discussion of Section 702 later, that the program 
conducted under the FISC’s authority is also implicated in the “incidental” 
collection of the content of USPs: 
When the NSA aims for foreign targets whose communications cross 
U.S. infrastructure, it expects to sweep in some American content 
“incidentally” or “inadvertently,” which are terms of art in regulations 
governing the NSA. Contact chaining, because it extends to the 
contacts of contacts of targets, inevitably collects even more American 
data.… 
When asked why the NSA could not release an unclassified copy of its 
“minimization procedures,” which are supposed to strip accidentally 
collected records of their identifying details, the official suggested a 
reporter submit a freedom-of-information request.145 
 
Declassified Inspectors General Report 
The 2013 disclosures by Snowden included a draft version of the NSA 
Inspector General’s contribution to the 2009 43-page unclassified version.146 
It omitted discussion of many key facts that, then, were still classified. The 
government subsequently declassified many facts about surveillance. 
The New York Times filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking release of the 747-
page full and final report.147 On April 24, 2015, in response to the lawsuit, 
the government fully declassified148 the 2009 IG’s Report. 
• Declassified 2011 Opinion of FISC Judge John D. Bates149: In an 85-
page October 2011 ruling (declassified and released post-Snowden), 
Judge Bates (then serving as chief judge on the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court) wrote that the court found that its approval, in 
March 2009, of a government presentation to justify the bulk collection 
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of all Americans' phone call records was "premised on a flawed 
depiction" of how the program operated and how the NSA uses the 
data and "buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements in the 
government's submissions" to the court.150,151,152,153,154 
In a footnote, Bates wrote: “This misperception by the FISC existed 
from the inception of its authorized collection in May 2006, buttressed 
by repeated inaccurate statements made in the government’s 
submissions, and despite a government-devised and court-mandated 
oversight regime” [emphasis added].155  
The inaccurate statements were noted in a separate footnote, 
discussed below; they concerned revelations regarding the scope 
(volume and nature) of the NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions. 
 
Misdirection by the NSA and the Department of Justice 
It is evident in the Bates opinion that the NSA and the Department of 
Justice were as willing to misdirect the FISC as they were to misdirect 
Congress in the hearing before the House Judiciary Committee.156,157 The 
Court’s approval of contact chaining (hops) was based on “inaccurate 
statements made in the government’s submissions.” The approval was 
sought under the various permutations of the President’s/Terrorist 
Surveillance Program.158 When NSA Deputy Director John Chris Inglis, in his 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee stated that the FISA court 
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"has approved us to go out two or three hops,"159 and Deputy Attorney 
General James Cole said,  
The short court order...does not allow the government to access or use 
them. That is covered by another, more detailed court order [that]... 
provides that the government can only search the data if it has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the phone number being 
searched is associated with certain terrorist organizations,160  
 
they were referring to a 2007 Justice Department memo, discussed below.161 
In it, the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General approval 
pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed amendment to procedures 
governing the National Security Agency's Signals Intelligence Activities.162 
  
2007 Justice Department Memo  
 The FISC ruling seems to point to a January 2007 announcement in 
which the Justice Department said it had worked out an “innovative” 
arrangement with the FISC that provided the “necessary speed and agility” 
to provide court review of all warrants on all wiretaps in terrorism 
investigations to monitor international communications of people inside the 
United States without jeopardizing national security.163 What these terms 
meant was made clear at the announcement: A week prior, the Justice 
Department had obtained multiple orders or warrants (certifications) from 
the FISA court allowing it to monitor international communications in cases 
where there was probable cause to believe one of the participants was linked 
to Al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist group.164 According to then-Attorney 
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General Gonzales, “as a result of these orders any electronic surveillance 
that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program [emphasis 
added] will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.”165 
 
Permission to Gather and Analyze Metadata on U.S. Persons 
Thanks to a Justice Department Memo, disclosed by Snowden, we 
know what the basis was for the “innovative arrangement.” The NSA 
gained166 authority to "analyze communications metadata associated with 
United States persons and persons believed to be in the United States," 
according to a November 20, 2007, Justice Department memo,167 in which, 
as noted above, the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General 
approval pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed amendment to 
procedures governing the National Security Agency's Signals Intelligence 
Activities [emphasis added].168,169  The synopsis states that the 
“supplemental procedures” 
would clarify that the National Security Agency (NSA) may analyze 
communications metadata associated with United States persons and 
persons believed to be in the United States. These Supplemental 
Procedures would amend the existing procedures promulgated 
pursuant to Executive Order 12.333. That Order requires the NSA to 
conduct its signals intelligence activities involving the collection, 
retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States 
persons in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney 
General. Accordingly, changes to these procedures, such as those 
proposed here, also require your approval. We conclude that the 
proposed Supplemental Procedures are consistent with applicable law 
and we recommend that you approve them [emphasis added]. 
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The communications metadata that the NSA wishes to []170 relates to 
telephone calls and electronic dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling information that does not concern the substance, purport, or 
meaning of the communication. … This communications metadata has 
been obtained by various methods, including pursuant to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801171, et seq., 
[emphasis added] and resides in NSA databases. NSA plans to analyze 
this data primarily using a technique known as "contact chaining." 
Contact chaining involves the identification of telephone numbers, 
email addresses, or IP addresses that a targeted telephone number, IP 
address, or e-mail address has contacted or attempted to contact.172 
 
 In January 2008, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey signed the 
document (including a set of “Supplemental Procedures” on the use of 
Americans’ Internet metadata that had been signed in October 2007 by 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates), stating:  
NSA will continue to disseminate the results of its contact chaining and 
other analysis of communications metadata in accordance with current 
procedures governing the dissemination of information concerning U.S. 
persons," without detailing the "current procedures."173 
 
 
The Program Continues through the Obama Administration  
This program continued for more than two years into the Obama 
administration.174 In response to the release of the November 2007 Memo, 
the ACLU submitted a FOIA request to the DOJ in relation to the information 
presented in the 2007 announcement. (See below under Civil Society 
Engagement.) 
• FISA Court Opinion Granting the Application Made by the Government 
in 2006: The Opinion of the FISC granting the Government’s 
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application, made in the Government Memorandum of Law, was 
released by ODNI in November 2013.175,176 The date of issuance of the 
Opinion is redacted, but it could well be the January 2007 certifications 
noted by Attorney General Gonzales above. 
 
Civil Society Engagement 
The 2013 release of the declassified 2011 FISC Opinion (above) marks 
the first time the government had disclosed a FISA court opinion in response 
to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, brought in 2012 by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation. EFF sued after Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), in July 2012, 
got the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to acknowledge that the 
NSA’s surveillance had at least once violated the Constitution.177 Staff 
Attorney Mark Rumold said, “It’s unfortunate it took a year of litigation and 
the most significant leak in American history to finally get them to release 
this opinion but I’m happy that the administration is beginning to take this 
debate seriously.”178 
 ACLU submitted a FOIA request for the Government Memorandum of 
Law179 (see above) submitted to the FISC on May 23, 2006, by AG Alberto 
Gonzales, Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, and James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy. ACLU 
received the document180 on November 18, 2013. Civil liberties 
organizations also engaged in analysis181 of what was known/learned about 
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the Program. As it was conducted entirely in secret until exposed - partially 
in 2009 and more fully in 2013 - there was little opportunity for advocacy 
other than reports and statements to congressional committees. 
What Is Occurring Now?  
 This program is now incorporated into Section 702 of the 2008 FISA 
Amendments Act. 
 
Section 702, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act 
In 2008, Congress struck Section 702 of the FISA and replaced it with 
a new Section 702 created in Public Law 110-261, the 2008 FISA 
Amendments Act.182,183 This version essentially codifies the President’s 
Surveillance Program: It permits the bulk collection - from American 
companies - of Americans’ overseas communications (telephone calls and e-
mail, including the associated metadata) as long as the government is 
targeting foreigners abroad.184 The section says surveillance may be 
authorized by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence 
without prior approval by the FISC, as long as minimization requirements 
and general procedures blessed by the court are followed. Rather than 
approving each target individually, the court simply approves annual 
“certifications” allowing the targeting of broad categories of people. It is, 
though, NSA agents who decide which particular phone lines and email 
accounts will be wiretapped, and there is no explicit requirement that these 
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particular phones and email addresses be foreign - only the program’s 
overall target must be.185 
Although the targets of the eavesdropping have to be “reasonably 
believed” to be outside the United States, as former Deputy Attorney 
General David Kris explains in his book on the law,186 the “target” of a 
surveillance program under FAA is typically just the foreign group - such as 
Al Qaeda or Wikileaks - that the government is seeking information about187: 
 
[The FAA’s] certification provision states that the government under 
Section 1881a is “not required to identify the specific facilities, places 
premises, or property at which an acquisition … will be directed or 
conducted.” This is a significant grant of authority, because it allows 
for authorized acquisition - surveillance or a search - directed at any 
facility or location. For example, an authorization targeting “al Qaeda” 
- which is a non-U.S. person located abroad—could allow the 
government to wiretap any telephone that it believes will yield 
information from or about al Qaeda, either because the telephone is 
registered to a person whom the government believes is affiliated with 
al Qaeda, or because the government believes that the person 
communicates with others who are affiliated with al Qaeda, regardless 
of the location of the telephone. … Review of the certification is limited 
to the question “whether [it] contains all the required elements”; the 
FISC does not look behind the government’s assertions. Thus, for 
example, the FISC could not second-guess the government’s foreign 
intelligence purpose of conducting the acquisition, as long as the 
certification in fact asserts such a purpose [emphasis added].188 
 
Indeed, in a 2011 FISC Opinion - noted earlier and discussed in detail 
below - Judge John D. Bates found that the agency had violated the 
Constitution and noted serial misrepresentations to the Court.189 
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NSA Systemic Overcollection of Domestic Communications 
 On April 15, 2009, as a result of a disclosure from a non-identified 
source, the New York Times reported that the NSA is involved in “significant 
and systemic” overcollection of domestic communications.190 
The overcollection problems appear to have been uncovered as part of 
a twice-annual certification that the Justice Department and the 
director of national intelligence are required to give to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court on the protocols that the N.S.A. is using 
in wiretapping. That review, which according to officials began in the 
waning days of the Bush administration and was continued by the 
Obama administration, led intelligence officials to realize that the NSA 
was improperly capturing information involving significant amounts of 
American traffic. 
Notified of the problems by the N.S.A., officials with both the House 
and Senate intelligence committees said they had concerns that the 
agency had ignored civil liberties safeguards built into last year’s 
wiretapping law.191 
 
And yet, as will be discussed below, officials with both the House and 
Senate intelligence committees reauthorized the legislation on January 11, 
2018, without added protections for civil liberties. 
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 What We Learned as a Result the Snowden Documents 
192 
Figure: Two Programs - PRISM and Upstream - Authorized By Section 702. 
 
 The PRISM program allows the NSA to receive data directly from the 
servers of U.S. companies like Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, Google, and 
Facebook, and thus collect the contents of foreign targets' emails, text and 
video chats, photographs, and more.  
 The Upstream program was pointed to in the declassified Inspectors 
General Report and in a December 23, 2005, New York Times story, in which 
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau revealed that the NSA had been capturing 
American communications on a much broader scale by "tapping directly into 
some of the American telecommunication systems.”193 The program is 
discussed in detail below. 
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Declassified October 13, 2011, Opinion of FISC Judge John D. Bates 
 A 2011 Opinion (noted above) was released along with several others 
related to the collection program approved by Congress in 2008 under 
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.194,195 In the ruling, Judge Bates 
found that the agency had violated the Constitution and he noted serial 
misrepresentations to the Court196: 
The court is troubled that the government’s revelations regarding 
N.S.A.’s acquisition of Internet transactions197 mark the third instance 
in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a 
substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection 
program. 
 
For the first time, the government has now advised the court that the 
volume and nature of the information it has been collecting is 
fundamentally different from what the court had been led to believe.198  
 
 Through Upstream, the NSA amasses a database of hundreds of 
millions of Americans’ phone-call records: numbers dialed and the time and 
duration of calls (i.e., metadata), but no content. Bates continued: “Contrary 
to the government’s repeated assurances, NSA had been routinely running 
queries of the metadata using querying terms that did not meet the required 
standard.” The Court concluded that this requirement had been “so 
frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that this 
critical element of the overall. . .regime has never functioned effectively.”199 
Judge Bates further noted that the collection of purely domestic 
communications (Upstream) is likely to continue.  
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• NSA collected tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications: 
According to the opinion, the NSA, for several years, “has acquired, is 
acquiring, and if the certifications and procedures now before the 
Court is approved, will continue to acquire, unlawfully gathered tens of 
thousands of e-mails and other electronic communications between 
Americans as part of a now-revised collection method (see 2007 DOJ 
announcement and subsequent Memorandum discussed earlier). Based 
on NSA numbers the Court estimated that the spy agency may have 
been collecting as many as 56,000 “wholly domestic” communications 
each year.200  
Senator Ron Wyden, in a statement on August 21, 2013, said “The 
FISA Court has noted that this collection violates the spirit of the law 
but the government has failed to address this concern in the two years 
since this ruling was issued.201 This ruling makes it clear that FISA 
Section 702, as written, is insufficient to adequately protect the civil 
liberties and privacy rights of law-abiding Americans and should be 
reformed.”202 
• Upstream Collection Communications may contain entire Internet 
"Transactions” not related to the target and diverted  into a repository:  
Bates further noted that it was not until 2011 (the amended Section 
702 was approved in 2008) that the NSA told the court that its 
“upstream” collection of Internet communications may contain entire 
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Internet “transactions” not related to the target (even as vaguely 
described the “target” might be) (reported by The Washington Post 
and others).203,204 In June 2011, the NSA informed Bates that an 
Internet transaction may be a single communication, or it may include 
“multiple discrete communications,” including those that are not to, 
from, or about a target. “That revelation fundamentally alters the 
Court’s understanding of the scope of the collection conducted 
pursuant to Section 702,” Bates said [emphasis added].205  
Judge Bates’ opinion also noted that under the NSA’s “upstream” 
collection, the NSA diverted international data passing through fiber-
optic cables in the United States into a repository where the material 
could be stored temporarily for processing, and for the selection of 
foreign communications, rather than domestic ones. According to a 
press conference call on the newly declassified court opinion, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that it was 
"technologically impossible to" filter out the “wholly domestic” 
communications between Americans.206 
According to a report about a conference call (about the 
declassification and release of the ruling), an IC official indicated that 
the FISA Court paused the program (discussed below) but said, 
If you have a webmail email account, like Gmail or Hotmail, you know 
that if you open up your email program, you will get a screenshot of 
some number of emails that are sitting in your inbox. Those are all 
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transmitted across the internet as one communication. For 
technological reasons, the NSA was not capable of breaking those 
down, and still is not capable, of breaking those down into their 
individual [email] components.207 
 
If one of those emails contained a reference to a foreign person 
believed to be outside the U.S. - in the subject line, the sender or the 
recipient, for instance - then the NSA would collect the entire 
screenshot "that's popping up on your screen at the time. On occasion, 
some of those [emails] might prove to be wholly domestic." If a 
foreign person being targeted is in contact with an American, "you can 
get all that U.S. person's screenshot" from his or her inbox.208 
The official also noted, “The court found the NSA's procedures for 
purging wholly domestic communications needed to be beefed up, and 
that's what was done."209 
• Collection paused - then restarted: In the Opinion, Judge Bates 
ordered the collection to stop until the NSA could propose an 
acceptable remedy. In November 2011, Bates signed an order 
approving the fix, which included a new technical means to segregate 
transactions most likely [emphasis added] to contain U.S. persons’ 
communications, and reducing the retention period from five to two 
years. As discussed below, in April 2012 the NSA decided to conduct a 
purge of all upstream data collected since Section 702’s inception in 
2008. 
58
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
• Approved certification of targets: As a result of Snowden releases, we 
learned that in July 2008, the court approved the first two 
certifications for “counterterrorism” and “foreign government” 
targets.210 In March 2009, the court approved a third certification for 
targets engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.211 
On their faces, these approvals seem unsurprising, but recall the 
explanation from former Deputy Attorney General David Kris about 
what the certification provision entails: 
[The FAA’s] certification provision states that the government under 
Section 1881a is “not required to identify the specific facilities, places, 
premises, or property at which an acquisition … will be directed or 
conducted.” This is a significant grant of authority, because it allows 
for authorized acquisition—surveillance or a search—directed at any 
facility or location. For example, an authorization targeting “al 
Qaeda”—which is a non-U.S. person located abroad—could allow the 
government to wiretap any telephone that it believes will yield 
information from or about al Qaeda, either because the telephone is 
registered to a person whom the government believes is affiliated with 
al Qaeda, or because the government believes that the person 
communicates with others who are affiliated with al Qaeda, regardless 
of the location of the telephone. … Review of the certification is limited 
to the question “whether [it] contains all the required elements”; the 
FISC does not look behind the government’s assertions. Thus, for 
example, the FISC could not second-guess the government’s foreign 
intelligence purpose of conducting the acquisition, as long as the 
certification in fact asserts such a purpose [emphasis added].212 
 
This practice was codified in the 2012 reauthorization of the Act.213 
 
What Has Occurred since the FISC Rulings?214 
 
• NSA Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails “About” Foreign Targets: On 
April 28, 2017, the NSA said it had halted collecting Americans’ emails 
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and texts exchanged with people overseas that simply mention 
identifying terms- like email addresses - for foreigners on whom the 
agency is spying, but are neither to nor from those targets. NSA 
analysts are still, however, permitted to search for an American’s 
information within another repository of emails gathered through the 
warrantless surveillance program’s PRISM or “downstream” system, 
which gathers emails of foreign targets from providers like Gmail and 
Yahoo Mail. That system does not collect “about” communications. As 
noted below, the ruling from the FISC presiding judge, Judge 
Rosemary M. Collyer, subsequently authorized215 the agency to use 
Americans’ identifiers to query the newly captured [emphasis added] 
upstream internet messages for future intelligence investigations. 
• NSA Conducts Purge of All Upstream Collected 2008–2012: In April 
2012, the NSA decided to conduct a purge of all upstream data 
collected since Section 702’s inception in 2008, senior intelligence 
officials said.216 They could not estimate the quantity, but one official 
said it was “lots.” According to another official: “It would have been 
everything.”217 But they have continued to collect upstream data. 
• “Backdoor Search Loophole” authorized by FISC: An NSA official said 
the FISC’s presiding judge, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, authorized218 
the agency to use Americans’ identifiers to query the newly captured 
[emphasis added] upstream internet messages for future intelligence 
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investigations. Once collected through PRISM, the communications of 
Americans are put into databases that are routinely searched by the 
FBI when starting - or even before officially starting - investigations 
into domestic crimes that may ultimately have nothing to do with 
foreign intelligence issues. With Judge Collyer’s authorization, the 
government is now allowed to conduct these searches on 
communications collected as part of its “upstream” collection as well. 
 In April 2017, the NSA issued a Statement indicating that: 
 
After considerable evaluation of the program and available technology, 
NSA has decided that its Section 702 foreign intelligence surveillance 
activities will no longer include any upstream internet communications 
that are solely "about" a foreign intelligence target. Instead, this 
surveillance will now be limited to only those communications that are 
directly "to" or "from" a foreign intelligence target. These changes are 
designed to retain the upstream collection that provides the greatest 
value to national security while reducing the likelihood that NSA will 
acquire communications of U.S. persons or others who are not in 
direct contact with one of the Agency's foreign intelligence targets. 
In addition, as part of this curtailment, NSA will delete the vast 
majority of previously acquired upstream internet communications as 
soon as practicable.219 
 
 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns about Backdoor Search 
 The concern for privacy advocates and civil libertarians is that the 
government (in particular, the FBI) is permitted to seek out the content of 
Americans’ communications that have been swept up through Section 702 
without any suspicion of wrongdoing, let alone a warrant. Civil liberties and 
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privacy advocates call this the “backdoor search loophole” and have wanted 
Congress to require the government to obtain a warrant to search for 
Americans’ incidentally collected information within the warrantless 
surveillance repository. 
 Senator Ron Wyden, in particular, has been dogged in pushing the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for transparency about an estimate of 
the number of Americans whose communications have been collected under 
Section 702.220 Members of the House have also weighed in strongly.221 DNI 
Coats, at his February 28, 2017 confirmation hearing, told Senator Wyden 
(and the Committee) that “I’m going to do everything I can to work with 
Admiral Rogers in NSA to get you that number.” In June, Director Coats said 
providing the number is “infeasible.”222 
 
Civil Society Engagement 
 
In 2008, the EFF filed a lawsuit, Jewel v. National Security Agency, 
challenging “upstream” surveillance (as well as other bulk collection 
activities) on behalf of AT&T customers whose communications and 
telephone records were collected by the NSA.223 In 2016, the district court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment arguments, but has not issued a 
ruling on their First Amendment claims, and the case is (as of this writing) in 
discovery.224 
 In addition to suing the government agencies involved in the domestic 
dragnet, Jewel v. NSA also targets the individuals responsible for creating 
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authorizing and implementing the illegal program including DIRNSA Keith 
Alexander and former Vice President Dick Cheney, Cheney’s former chief of 
staff David Addington, former Attorney General and White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales, and other individuals who ordered or participated in the 
warrantless domestic surveillance.225 
 
The Obama Administration Moves to Dismiss the Case  
 The Obama administration moved to dismiss Jewel in 2009, claiming 
that litigation over the wiretapping program would require the government 
to disclose privileged “state secrets,” and that it was immune from suit. The 
court instead ruled that the case should be dismissed on standing 
grounds. In December of 2011, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to provide standing and Jewel could 
proceed in district court. 
 In July 2012, EFF moved to have the court declare that the FISA law 
applies instead of the state secrets privilege; in September 2012, the 
government renewed its "state secrets" claims, and the matter was heard by 
the federal district court in San Francisco on December 14, 2012. In July 
2013, the court rejected the government’s “state secrets” argument, ruling 
that any properly classified details can be litigated under the procedures of 
FISA.226 The court did dismiss some of EFF’s statutory claims, but the other 
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claims, including that the program violates the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, continue.227 
 
A Challenge to "Upstream" Surveillance of Online Communications 
 In addition, Wikimedia, PEN American Center, and The Nation, among 
other organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging “upstream” surveillance of 
online communications, raising both First Amendment and Fourth 
Amendment arguments.228 The Wikimedia plaintiffs claim that upstream 
surveillance impedes their journalism, advocacy, and publishing activities. 
The district court ruled against Wikimedia in 2015, and an appeal is pending 
before the Fourth Circuit.229 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press filed an amicus brief in that case on behalf of itself and 17 news media 
organizations, arguing that upstream surveillance chills newsgathering and 
violates the First and Fourth Amendments.230 
The EFF filed a FOIA request in 2016 for FISC opinions related to 
Section 702. On June 13, 2017, the FISA Court released 18 redacted 
opinions regarding FISA Section 702.231,232 Mark Rumold of EFF notes that  
The opinions show that, almost from the outset of the law in 2008, the 
intelligence community has overstepped the court-imposed legal 
restrictions on the operation of the surveillance. Most of the 
documents tell a story of the IC overstepping boundaries, getting 
reprimanded by the FISC, but nevertheless being allowed to continue 
and even expand surveillance under the law.233 
 
Additionally, organizations have repeatedly challenged the 
constitutional and statutory basis of bulk surveillance. Civil society 
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organizations have actively worked to inform and educate Congress and the 
public about the issues and what should be done: commentaries, letters, and 
organization testimony by civil society are here.234 A number of these relate 
specifically to the expected reauthorization of the legislation in 2017 (see 
below). 
 
USA Freedom Act 
I go into some detail here as, before the FISA Amendment Act 
Reauthorization, these were the latest commitments made by the 
Intelligence Community.235 They were only imposed with the IC’s tacit 
consent, but give a clear sense of the known end-runs and violations 
perpetrated by the IC since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 - 
and are focused on those publicly known violations. Indeed, the full name of 
the Act is “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending 
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection and Online Monitoring Act.” It is quite 
specific in its requirements and prohibitions (as opposed to the 2017 
Reauthorization discussed below). 
 
Title I 
 Title I bans the extant system of bulk collection under Section 215 of 
the PATRIOT Act. 
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• Additionally, it stipulates that for call detail records, for pen registers 
and trap-and-trace, and for the FBI to issue the bulk collection of 
national security letters, the government must base the applications 
on a “specific selection term” - a term that “specifically identifies a 
person, account, address, or personal device” in a way that “limit[s], 
to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible 
things sought consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible 
things.” 
• In regard to hops, the government can apply for records within the 
first hop of the specific selection term if it (1) states “reasonable 
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced 
based on [a] specific selection term ... are relevant to [an authorized] 
investigation,” and (2) has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that 
the selection term is “associated with a foreign power engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or an agent 
of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor.” To apply for records within the second hop, the 
government must state “session-identifying information or a telephone 
calling card number identified by the specific selection term” used to 
produce call detail records within the first hop. 
• To safeguard against overbroad collection, the government must 
“adopt minimization procedures” calling for “the prompt destruction of 
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all call detail records” determined not to be “foreign intelligence 
information.” FISA court judges may, moreover, “impose additional, 
particularized minimization procedures” with respect to any 
“nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United 
States person.” 
 
Title III 
 Title III prohibits the use, in court proceedings, of information 
obtained under Section 702 through procedures deemed by a FISA Court to 
be “deficient concerning any United States person.” Nor may the 
government “use...or disclose...in any other manner” such information. 
The law also addresses reform of the FISA Court. It provides for the 
appointment of amici curiae to assist the FISA Court, who may provide 
assistance with respect to “legal arguments or information regarding any … 
area relevant to the issue presented to the court,” but only if the FISA Court 
deems such information relevant and only in certain matters that “present a 
novel or significant interpretation of the law” in the eyes of the FISA Court 
[emphasis added]. It also provides for limited appellate review of FISA Court 
decisions, as well as limited Supreme Court review of FISA Court of Review 
decisions.  
 The law requires the DNI to perform declassification review [emphasis 
added] of FISA Court opinions that “include...a significant construction or 
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interpretation” of any provision of law and, following such declassification 
review, make certain parts of FISA Court opinion publicly available.236  
 
Title VI 
 Title VI prescribes extensive disclosure requirements with respect to 
data about FISA collection, in particular, under Sections 601 and 602, the 
government must disclose to Congress, as well as to the public, various 
items regarding the number of orders and certifications sought and received; 
estimates of the number of people targeted and affected by surveillance; 
and the number of appointments of amici curiae, among other items of 
information [emphasis added]. 
 As noted earlier, USAF reinstates three provisions of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, which expired on June 1: roving wiretaps of terror suspects who change 
devices, surveillance of "lone wolf" suspects who are not affiliated with a 
terrorist organization, and the seeking of court orders to search business 
records.  
 As noted above, this law has the Intelligence Community’s tacit 
imprimatur, so the limitations the law imposes should be read with an ear 
toward how they are likely to be interpreted.237 What appear to be 
substantive interpretations appear in the reauthorization of the FISA 
Amendment Act below. 
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Civil Society Engagement 
 
 Civil society letters and testimony to Congress, from 2014 to 2015, on 
the USA FREEDOM Act are here.238 As noted above, Title IV of the USA 
Freedom Act requires the DNI to perform declassification review of FISA 
Court opinions that “include...a significant construction or interpretation” of 
any provision of law and, following such declassification review, make 
certain parts of FISA Court opinion publicly available. In October 2016, the 
ACLU and Yale Law School’s Media Freedom and Information Access (MFIA) 
filed a third motion seeking the release of all FISC opinions containing “novel 
or significant interpretations” of law issued between 9/11 and the passage of 
the USA Freedom Act in June 2015.239 
 
 
FISA Amendment Act Reauthorization 
 The FISA Amendment Act was reauthorized in 2012 for five years. 
• Lead Up to 2017 Reauthorization: The FISA Amendment Act was 
scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017. The intent of some 
segments of Congress was to reauthorize with no changes. Among 
some Members (including Senators and Representatives) and among 
civil society, an effort was made to reform the Act (the final iteration 
of this effort was the USA RIGHTS Act240). Specifically, the battle was 
over the NSA’s “incidental” eavesdropping on Americans via its 
warrantless surveillance program, Upstream and the authorization for 
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the FBI to seek this data without a warrant. As discussed above, 
privacy and civil liberties advocates wanted this “backdoor search 
loophole” closed. They consider it a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
• What Happened in the Reauthorization? The Brennan Center for Justice 
made available in the days leading up to the votes on reauthorization a 
table241 outlining the key issues (from the civil liberties and privacy 
perspectives, in italics). The key points of comparison of the USA 
RIGHTS Amendment” and the FISA Reauthorization Amendments Act 
(S.139)242 are below. The discussion of S. 139 also draws on the 
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) analysis of what the final 
bill contains.243 
• Prohibition of “about” collection (collecting communications not just to 
or from foreign targets, but also communications that merely 
reference them): 
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government 
may not collect communications that are not to or from the target of 
surveillance. 
S. 139 codifies a permissive process for resuming “about” collection, 
where the NSA searches the content of communications for a targeted 
email address, phone number or other selector.  
 
As discussed earlier, “about” collection was not legislatively 
authorized, rather it was carried out under certifications from the FISC 
- although for a number of years it was not clear to the Court that 
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these collections were contained in the declarations made in the 
requests for certification. Upon understanding that “about” collection is 
more likely to return communications that are wholly unrelated to a 
“target” and purely domestic, the FISA Court instituted special privacy 
rules governing its use. When the NSA was unable to follow those 
rules, the practice stopped, with the possibility of resuming after court 
approval later.244 The bill simply codified existing practice - if the NSA 
gets its compliance act together and the FISA Court signs off, the 
“about” program may start again. The bill adds a 30-day notice 
requirement to Congress so it may intervene and theoretically prevent 
its resumption. 
The administration was set to obtain its next annual court order in late 
April 2018, which is a logical restart point if the technical issues are 
resolved.  
• Protection of Americans’ privacy by requiring a warrant to access 
Americans’ phone calls and e-mails: 
S.139 authorizes such warrantless searches - a practice that was not 
previously expressly authorized in law - except in “predicated criminal 
investigations” unrelated to national security or foreign intelligence. A 
“predicated” investigation is one that has reached a certain stage of 
fact-finding. 
 
The government remains free under S. 139 to conduct warrantless 
searches during the earlier phases of the investigation - which is when 
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backdoor searches routinely occur, according to the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board. In practice, a warrant would almost never 
be necessary, as the FBI itself has acknowledged. It has explained that 
it regularly searches its 702 databases with Americans’ identifiers, 
looking for their communications only on the basis of a tip and long 
before formal investigations are opened.245 
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have required the government to 
obtain a warrant before querying Section 702 data to obtain 
Americans’ communications, with narrow exceptions—including an 
emergency exception that allows the government to proceed without a 
warrant if someone’s life or safety is in danger (for instance, a 
kidnapping situation). 
 
• Prohibition on the government from collecting wholly domestic 
communications (namely, those with Americans on both ends of the 
call or e-mail) under Section 702: 
S.139 does nothing to halt this practice. 
 
Recent exchanges between Senator Wyden and intelligence officials 
strongly suggest that the government is knowingly collecting wholly 
domestic communications under Section 702.246  
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government 
may not acquire communications it knows to be wholly domestic under 
Section 702. 
 
• Meaningful limitation on the ways in which Section 702 
communications can be used against Americans: 
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S. 139 contains no limits on the use of Americans’ communications in 
investigations, or in legal proceedings other than criminal prosecutions 
(such as immigration actions). It also allows the use of Americans’  
communications as evidence in criminal cases if the Attorney General 
makes a determination - which cannot be challenged or reviewed by 
any court - that the case relates to or affects national security, or that 
it involves death, kidnapping, serious bodily injury, specified offenses 
against minors, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, transnational 
crime, or human trafficking.247 
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have limited the use of Americans’ 
communications to cases involving terrorism, espionage, WMDs, 
cybersecurity threats, critical infrastructure, and threats against U.S. 
or allied armed forces, and prevent the use of warrantless access to 
evidence against Americans in ordinary criminal cases. 
 
• Ensure that people will be notified if the government uses Section 702-
derived information against them in domestic legal proceedings; allow 
Americans who have reason to think their communications were 
obtained under Section 702 to challenge the surveillance248: 
S.139, Section 111 requires the Attorney General to brief the 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on whether and how the 
Department of Justice notifies people that 702 information and other 
information collected under FISA authorities is used against them in 
official proceedings. This includes the introduction of 702 evidence in a 
criminal prosecution - but also in all trials, hearings, and proceedings, 
conducted by any “court, department, officer, agency, regulatory 
body.” The notice requirements extend to any “aggrieved person” 
which includes Americans and non-citizens, as well as targets of 
surveillance and those who communicate with a target. 
 
The briefing required in Section 111 is critical, because the 
government has refused to explain how information derived from 702 
surveillance is used to build cases, or is used to collect the same or 
similar information through other surveillance authorities, and thus 
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obscure the source of the information - known as “parallel 
construction.” Regrettably, none of this has to be memorialized in 
writing, and none of it has to be made public. 
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government 
must notify parties to legal proceedings when it uses information 
against them that it would not have acquired without Section 702 
surveillance. 
 
Also, codification in S. 139 of a definition of “about” collection (see 
above) effectively removed any prospect of a statutory challenge 
based on a claim that “about” collection was not authorized by 
Congress.249  
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that someone has been 
“injured” by Section 702 surveillance, for purposes of bringing allowed 
to bring a court challenge, if they reasonably believe their 
communications have been collected and if they have taken objectively 
reasonable steps to avoid the surveillance. 
 
• Number of known U.S. Persons for whom the FBI Searches/Number of 
queries FBI conducts: 
S.139, Section 112 requires the Justice Department Inspector General 
(IG) to audit the process by which the FBI queries U.S. person 
information and uses it. The audit will include how the FBI handles 
searches for people whose nationality is not known, how the FBI 
ensures compliance with its internal querying procedures, and how the 
FBI uses queries in foreign intelligence investigations or criminal 
assessments. It also directs the IG to examine what is preventing the 
FBI from estimating the number of queries it conducts or the known 
U.S. persons for which it searches. 
 
The FBI has declined, thus far, to track this number.250 
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 Some Whistleblower Protections 
 Additionally, Section 110 extends some whistleblower protections to IC 
contractor employees - about one-fourth of the IC workforce - the same 
incentives and protections as employees to blow the whistle on waste, fraud, 
or abuse without fear of retaliation. Employees have protection 
under President Obama’s 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 19, Part A.251  
Under Section 110, contract employees are now protected to report 
wrongdoing, but enforcement mechanisms against retaliation are lacking in 
the bill itself: “The President shall provide for the enforcement of this 
subsection.” 
 
Civil Society Engagement  
 Since early 2016, civil society organizations have been writing letters 
to Congress, providing testimony, and posting commentaries252 on the issues 
with Section 702 and how/why it needed - and needs - to be reformed 
 
Issues with Congressional Oversight 
It is obvious that something is deeply amiss with congressional 
oversight of the IC and its activities. This failure of robust oversight is 
critical, especially as the Administration White Paper claimed that the 
Section 215 bulk collection is legal, in large part because Congress twice (as 
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of August 2013) extended the PATRIOT Act without changing the terms of 
Section 215: 
Moreover, information concerning the use of Section 215 to collect 
telephony metadata in bulk was made available to all Members of 
Congress, and Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change after 
this information was provided. It is significant to the legal analysis of 
the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity and of the 
source of its legal authority when the statute was reauthorized.253 
 
A key part of the argument that the use of Section 215 is legal rests 
on the Administration’s claim that it gave notice to Congress about the 
expansion of the program. It is (sort of) hard to know whether to be as 
cynical about this issue as the authors of a Lawfare blog, 
Many members of Congress have spent the last few months appearing 
shocked by information leaked about the NSA’s surveillance 
programs. The documents released yesterday, however, make clear 
that any member of Congress who did not know what was going on 
with respect to Section 702 surveillance did not choose to know - 
including with regard to the government’s 2011 setback before the 
FISA Court.254 
  
Or, to believe the avowals of lack of knowledge by some members of 
Congress.255 
 
Limited Congressional Access to Intelligence Briefings 
It is hard to argue, however, that Congress has not caved to the 
demands of the executive branch that only a very small handful of Members 
(Senators and Representatives) be allowed in on secret briefings to read 
secret documents - without members of their staffs who are experts on 
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these laws and might be able to ask challenging questions. The Members 
cannot take notes and cannot speak of what they read or heard. Rather than 
conduct oversight, the Congress has accepted the secret assurances of 
secret agencies about deeply secret programs, and has amended the law to 
expand the authority of the executive well beyond what even the USA 
PATRIOT Act did, at least up to the USA Freedom Act in 2015. 
 The New York Times reported on December 16, 2005, that after “the 
special program” started, congressional leaders from both political parties, 
including the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees, were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office 
in the White House.256,257 The article noted that it was not clear how much 
the members of Congress were told about the presidential order and the 
eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to comment about the 
matter, while others did not return phone calls. Later briefings were held for 
members of Congress as they assumed leadership roles on the intelligence 
committees, officials familiar with the program said. 
 
Senator Rockefeller's Concerns regarding Expanded Surveillance 
 After a July 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West Virginia 
Democrat who became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
that year, sent a hand-written letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns 
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about the program.258 On December 20, 2005, The Washington Post wrote 
that 
what he heard alarmed him so much that immediately afterward he 
wrote two identical letters, by hand, expressing his concerns. He sent 
one to Vice President Cheney and placed the other - as he pointedly 
warned Cheney he would - in a safe in case anyone in the future might 
challenge his version of what happened. Rockefeller proved prophetic. 
Yesterday the 21-year Senate veteran from West Virginia released his 
copy of the letter - which when written, was so sensitive he dared not 
allow a staffer to read it, let alone type it. 
In eight sentences on two sheets of Senate letterhead, Rockefeller 
wrote obliquely of "the sensitive intelligence issues we discussed 
today." Yesterday, after confirming with White House officials that the 
letter contains no classified information, the senator said the briefing's 
topic was the National Security Agency's expanded surveillance of 
Americans, publicly disclosed last week by the New York Times and 
now at the center of a political furor.259 
 
There also has appeared to be a difference in how availability of 
information about the programs has been handled recently in the Senate 
and the House.260 In 2013, according to The Washington Post, 
a declassified document - cited repeatedly by both Administration 
officials and congressional leaders as assurance of meaningful 
congressional oversight of the bulk collection of domestic telephone 
data - was withheld from circulation by the House Intelligence 
Committee. A cover letter to the House and Senate intelligence 
committees asked the leaders of each panel to share the written 
material with all members of Congress. The Senate Intelligence 
Committee did so. The House Committee opted, instead, to invite all 
435 House members to attend classified briefings where the program 
was discussed - briefings that critics say were vague and 
uninformative. Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican who led the 
effort to defund the NSA's mass phone-records collection, said 
confronting intelligence officials during the briefings was “like a game 
of 20 questions,” and added: “If you don’t know about the program, 
you don’t know what to ask about.”261 
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• The Intelligence Committees and E.O. 12333: The National Security 
Act of 1947 requires that Congress be kept “fully and currently 
informed” about “significant” intelligence activities. Congress has 
arguably not been kept so informed, even though E.O.12333 activities 
are certainly “significant.” The problem, legal experts and lawmakers 
have said, is that only the executive branch - and the intelligence 
agencies that are part of it - determines what “fully and currently 
informed” means and what details it needs to share with Congress. 
As reported in a 2013 article, House Intelligence Committee 
member262 Adam Schiff, D-CA, noted, “There’s no clear definition. We 
need to have a bigger discussion of what our mutual understanding is 
of what we want to be informed of.”263 
The article also notes that Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, who then 
chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, has consistently defended 
the NSA’s collection of domestic cellphone metadata, saying the 
program under which it is doing so is overseen by both the courts and 
Congress. At the time, she called for a broad review of what’s taking 
place under 12333, noting that the order authorizes phone and email 
metadata collection beyond what FISA does. However, she also has 
said: “The other programs [the 12333 programs] do not (have the 
same oversight as FISA). And that’s what we need to take a look 
at.”264 She indicated that her committee [Senate Select Committee on 
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Intelligence] has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee the programs 
run under the executive order: “Twelve-triple-three programs are 
under the executive branch entirely.”265 
• Recent Efforts within Congress: On March 22, 2016, eight members of 
the House Intelligence Committee sent a letter to the Chair and 
Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee, requesting 
adequate funding to the House Office of the Sergeant at Arms to 
support Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information Security 
(TS/SCI) Clearance investigations for individual designees from each 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Member's personal 
staff to support their Member for hearings and markups.266 They 
noted: 
The lack of funding places an onerous burden on individual Members, 
as they are unable to have the assistance of staff at the most crucial 
times, and is a major oversight considering their counterparts on the 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are afforded SCI 
Clearance investigations for personal office designees.267 
 
The House Intelligence Committee and its Senate counterpart were 
intended to consolidate review of intelligence matters, inform the 
entire Congress of intelligence activities, and hold public hearings to 
inform the broader public. 
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Civil Society Engagement 
In September 2016, 33 organizations across the political spectrum 
sent a letter to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Democratic Leader 
Nancy Pelosi, urging them to adopt reforms to modernize the House’s 
intelligence oversight in order to provide a meaningful check on the 
Executive Branch and reform how it conducts oversight over intelligence 
matters.268 
The letter also urged them to consider establishing a distinct, broad-
based review of the activities of the IC since 9/11, modeled after the 9/11 
Commission or the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. As the letter notes, when 
questions were raised about the activities of the intelligence community in 
the 1970s,  
Congress reacted by forming two special committees, colloquially 
known as the Pike and Church committees. Reports preceded 
wholesale reforms of the intelligence community, including improving 
congressional-oversight mechanisms.269 The outcome improved 
congressional oversight and the perception of its efficacy. The House 
should provide the new select committee adequate staffing and 
financial support, and give it a broad mandate to review practices and 
structures associated with congressional oversight of intelligence 
matters.270 
 
The academic non-government community has also contributed 
analysis, commentary, and recommendations for remediation. A few of the 
contributions include those from Heidi Kitrosser271 and Kathleen Clark.272  
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Funneling Requirements and the Separation of Powers 
Kitrosser’s article on information funnels in the sharing of executive 
branch information with Congress identifies key questions over whether 
funneling requirements infringe on the separation of powers and thus need 
not always be obeyed, what if anything should follow from information 
funneling - whether, for example, those with whom information is shared 
should be able to take some action in response to what they learn. Kitrosser 
uses the recent controversy about warrantless surveillance by the NSA as a 
jumping-off point to explore these questions, explains that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to set information-sharing requirements between the 
executive branch and itself, and suggests some answers to the questions as 
to how information funneling requirements should work. 
Clark’s article on Congress’ Right to Counsel notes that, for decades, 
congressional leaders have acquiesced in the executive branch’s insistence 
that certain intelligence information not be shared with congressional 
staffers, even those staffers who have high-level security clearances. As a 
result, Congress has been hobbled in its ability to understand and analyze 
key executive branch programs. It puts this issue into the larger context of 
Congress’s right to access national security–related information, discusses 
congressional mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of that 
information, identifies several constitutional arguments for Congress’s right 
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to share information with its lawyers and other expert staff, and explores 
ways to achieve this reform. 
 
Secrecy and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Opinions 
The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was 
established by Congress and authorized under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 or FISA.273 Only the Executive Branch can submit 
requests. No one outside government can appear before the FISC judge 
without specific invitation.274 Its rulings and its opinions are all secret.  
The FISC started out (and has continued) as a secret court and, as Eric 
Lichtblau has noted, has quietly become almost a parallel Supreme Court, 
serving as the ultimate arbiter on surveillance issues and delivering opinions 
that will most likely shape intelligence practices for years to come, according 
to current and former officials familiar with the court’s classified decisions.275 
The FISC, whose statutory role is to approve warrant applications for 
surveillance activities related to national security, seems to have operated 
for years prior to 9/11 in the manner Congress had intended. Recent 
revelations raise significant questions about the conduct of the court. 
Instead of approving warrant applications, FISA court judges are, as noted 
earlier in regard to Section 215 orders, reviewing and approving bulk 
collections and “programmatic surveillance.” 
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The Extended Authority of the FISC 
Perhaps the greatest change at the FISC is that judges are no longer 
simply reviewing warrant applications for individual surveillance operations. 
The authority of the Court has been extended since 2001. It now has the 
authority to permit the electronic surveillance of entire categories—“without 
the need for a court order for each individual target” - of non-USPs located 
abroad.276 Under this provision, instead of issuing individual court orders, 
the FISC approves annual certifications submitted by the Attorney General 
and the DNI that identify categories of foreign intelligence targets.277 But 
although the statutes passed by Congress are available to the public, how 
those statutes have been interpreted and used remains secret. 
Civil society (and others) talk about “capture,” most frequently 
referring to the capture of regulatory agencies by outside (non-
governmental) “interests.” It is not inappropriate to talk about the FISC 
being captured by the White House and the IC. As noted above, we have 
seen some faint glimmerings of push-back (particularly in the House) in 
Congress. 
 
Some FISC Orders and Opinions Declassified in Response to FOIA 
Litigation 
On September 5, 2013, in a court filing278 responding to a judge’s 
order - in response to EFF FOIA litigation - the Justice Department said that 
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they would make public a host of material that will “total hundreds of pages” 
by next week, including: 
orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004, to June 
6, 2011, that contain a significant legal interpretation of the 
government’s authority or use of its authority under Section 215; and 
responsive “significant documents, procedures, or legal analyses 
incorporated into FISC opinions or orders and treated as binding by 
the Department of Justice or the National Security Agency.”279 
 
 The U.S. government says it is “broadly construing” that order and is 
declassifying a larger set of documents than the ruling requires.280 It 
provided hundreds of pages of documents to the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in response to a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information 
Act.281 
Some Recommendations for Reform of FISC 
The academic non-government community has also contributed 
analysis, commentary, and recommendations for remediation in this area. A 
few of the contributions include those from Emily Berman and Robert Stein, 
Walter Mondale, and Caitlinrose Fisher.282,283 
Berman’s article, The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, argues that after the Snowden disclosures, U.S. 
surveillance activities were thrust to the forefront of public debate, including 
questions about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”). 
The discussion, however, has underemphasized a critical feature of the way 
the FISA Court works: Not only its traditional role of “gatekeeper,” but also 
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the additional - and entirely different - role of “rule maker.” Further, the 
Article provides an assessment of the attempt to reform the FISA Court in 
the recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. She concludes that the Act 
represents a missed opportunity: In not fully appreciating or accounting for 
the unique challenges that the court’s rule-making function poses, the Act 
does not nearly go far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking 
competence. Moreover, she argues the Act neglects (as has the public 
debate) a critical area for reform: ensuring sufficient flow of information 
from the Executive Branch to the FISA Court. The article explores the nature 
of this challenge and offers some additional reform ideas for consideration. 
 Stein, Mondale, and Fisher note that in the wake of 9/11, Congress 
significantly altered FISA’s scheme, opening the door once again to 
executive overreach. Due to the changes to FISA, the Executive Branch is 
able to engage in practices similar to those that catalyzed the formation of 
the Church Committee and the enactment of FISA. This article chronicles the 
evolution of FISA and the FISA Court. Drawing on the unique perspective of 
Vice President Mondale, the article analyzes the ways in which the post-9/11 
Act and the Court are at odds with their original design.284 The article argues 
that such overreach is possible in part because of structural changes to the 
FISA Court and the executive branch’s invocation of the need for secrecy in 
non-FISA Court proceedings. According to the authors, the recently enacted 
USA FREEDOM Act fails to fix the structural issues that currently limit the 
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authority and efficacy of the FISA Court. The FISA Court no longer serves its 
intended function as a specialized Article III court of limited jurisdiction; 
rather, it is more akin to an adjunct to the executive branch, lending 
legitimacy to intelligence operations without practically limiting executive 
authority. The article concludes by recommending tangible actions Congress 
can and should take - structures and processes that limit executive authority 
and comport with Article III of the United States Constitution. 
 
Intelligence Community Transparency Since Snowden 
 The two epigraphs I included at the start of this article point to the 
critical question that bookends it and is at its heart: Why would or should we 
trust the Intelligence Community? Is there a true change of heart and mind 
reflected in the second quote from Bob Litt, or is the first one the truth and 
the second one public relations? 
 As I have laid out in the pages above, the White House, the 
Department of Justice, and the NSA have repeatedly lied (at a minimum, 
misdirected and “misrepresented”) to the FISC, to Congress, and - not least- 
to the American public. It is noteworthy that, since 2013, the NSA, the CIA, 
and the ODNI have each created an Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and 
Transparency, the heads and staffs of which are open, take their roles and 
responsibilities seriously, and have shown themselves to be trustworthy. The 
concerns expressed here are not intended to malign them or cast 
aspersions. 
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 Members of the privacy, civil liberties, and government openness 
communities have held “Chatham House Rule” meetings with these and 
other representatives from ODNI and NSA on the issue of declassification of 
FISC opinions and the government’s unwillingness to provide an index of any 
sort of those opinions it declines to declassify and release.285 
 Members of these communities have also met with these and other 
representatives from ODNI and the other intelligence agencies. Many of the 
discussions focused on transparency about an estimate of the number of 
Americans whose communications have been collected under Section 702. 
Although the civil society participants have offered ideas - in particular 
sampling - to counter the government’s claim that they would have to 
invade the privacy of the individuals collected under 702, and that the 
numbers make it impractical, the NSA continues to resist. As noted earlier, 
DNI Coats has stated that this is “infeasible.” 
 The ODNI has put a very large amount of information up on two 
sites.286 As noted in a February 2015 article, though, “Tens of thousands of 
pages of records on those efforts have been made public, largely in response 
to Freedom of Information Act requests and lawsuits.”287 As noted at the 
beginning of this article, some of the postings since then seem voluntary. 
 In December 2017, the Chief of the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties, 
Privacy and Transparency, notified various organizations that 
in September 2017, his office posted a guide with links to certain 
officially released documents related to the use by the Intelligence 
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Community (IC) of national security authorities. These documents 
have been published to meet legal requirements, as well as to carry 
out the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC.... We have 
now updated that Guide288 to include links to additional officially 
released documents. The updated links are annotated with an asterisk.  
In addition to this Updated Guide, please note that the IC has 
launched a new web portal, Intel.gov,289 which features the “Intel 
Vault.” The Intel Vault290 enables users to conduct full-text searches of 
the Section 702 documents posted on IC on the Record.291 
 
 
Lack of Whistleblower Protections within the Intelligence 
Community 
 There are some recent disturbing reports, however, reflecting on the 
IC’s commitment to accountability. The first is a Daily Beast report on 
February 11, 2018, noting that, according to an April 2017 finding (of an 
inspection run out of the Intelligence Community Inspector General office), 
the spy agencies - including the CIA and the NSA - were failing to protect 
intelligence workers who report waste, fraud, abuse, or criminality up the 
chain of command.292 The investigators working on the report looked into 
190 cases of alleged reprisal in six agencies, and uncovered that “over and 
over and over again, intelligence inspectors ruled that the agency was in the 
right, and the whistleblowers were almost always wrong.” According to the 
article, the report had been near completion but had been sequestered by 
the acting head of the Intelligence Community Inspector General office, 
Wayne Stone, following the discovery that one of the inspectors was himself 
a whistleblower in the middle of a federal lawsuit against the CIA (for 
retaliation for his own whistleblowing), according to former IC IG officials. 
89
McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
 Destruction of Presidential Surveillance Program Data 
A second report, from Politico, is that, according to recent court filings, 
the NSA destroyed surveillance data - Presidential Surveillance Program 
Internet content data - it pledged to preserve in connection with pending 
lawsuits, and apparently never took some of the steps it told a federal court 
it had taken to make sure the information wasn’t destroyed293: 
Since 2007, the NSA has been under court orders to preserve data 
about certain of its surveillance efforts that came under legal attack 
following disclosures that President George W. Bush ordered 
warrantless wiretapping of international communications after the 
2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. In addition, the agency has made a 
series of representations in court over the years about how it is 
complying with its duties. 
However, the NSA told U.S. District Court Judge Jeffrey White in a 
filing on Thursday night and another little-noticed submission last year 
that the agency did not preserve the content of internet 
communications intercepted between 2001 and 2007 under the 
program Bush ordered. To make matters worse, backup tapes that 
might have mitigated the failure were erased in 2009, 2011 and 2016, 
the NSA said. 
“The NSA sincerely regrets its failure to prevent the deletion of this 
data,” NSA’s deputy director of capabilities, identified publicly as 
“Elizabeth B.,” wrote in a declaration filed in October. “NSA senior 
management is fully aware of this failure, and the Agency is 
committed to taking swift action to respond to the loss of this data.” 
In the update Thursday, another NSA official said the data were 
deleted during a broad, housecleaning effort aimed at making space 
for incoming information. 
The NSA’s review to date reveals that this [Presidential Surveillance 
Program] Internet content data was not specifically targeted for 
deletion,” wrote the official, identified as “Dr. Mark O,” “but rather the 
PSP Internet content data matched criteria that were broadly used to 
delete data of a certain type…in response to mission requirements to 
free-up space and improve performance of the [redacted] back-up 
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system. The NSA is still investigating how these deletions came about 
given the preservation obligations extant at the time. The NSA, 
however, has no reason to believe at this time that PSP Internet 
content data was specifically targeted for deletion.294 
 
 
What Does the IC mean by “Transparency”? 
Finally, though, a fundamental question is what the IC means by 
“transparency” and the reasons for their engaging in it. In his Introduction to 
the 3rd Annual SIGINT Progress Report, and his final missive as DNI, James 
Clapper wrote: 
I issued the Principles of Intelligence Transparency two years ago, and 
believe more strongly than ever that responsible transparency is 
becoming increasingly inseparable from public trust, and consequently, 
from mission success. We cannot accomplish our mission without 
public trust, and to earn and retain that trust, we must better explain 
both our role in protecting national security, and the rules and 
oversight framework that governs our activities. This includes 
engaging with the public to enhance their understanding of the IC—
including meeting with civil society representatives to hear their 
concerns and better explain our perspectives. Of course, we must 
continue to carry out our obligation to protect intelligence sources, 
methods, and activities when disclosure would harm national security. 
Transparency is difficult, but also, in my view, essential.295 
 
 
Belief in Accountability or Public Relations? 
 I asked above if the second of the two epigraphs (included at the start 
of this article) reflect a true change of heart and mind by Bob Litt, or is the 
first one the truth and the second one public relations? My suspicions are 
toward the latter. Every public-facing statement I have found from the 
intelligence agencies’ leadership post-Snowden often uses exactly the same 
words and phrases.296 Each also contextualizes the transparency 
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commitment, as does DNI Clapper’s statement above, with a limitation (an 
implied or stated “but of course”) - an obligation to protect intelligence 
sources, methods, and activities. This is facially unobjectionable, but there is 
no legal definition of “methods,” so it is an open door to withholding 
information.297 
 The framing here, as in the second Bob Litt quote at the start of this 
paper, is that public trust is essential to mission success - not a value in 
itself. Transparency is protective, not a commitment to the public or to 
accountable government. 
Keeping the Bubble of Secrecy Pierced 
 The reality is, of course, that the information is in the hands of the 
intelligence agencies that have understood their mission, as one individual 
put it, to be collecting information and keeping it secret, not sharing it. From 
the perspective of the public, and its representatives, however, “we don’t 
know what we don’t know.” As James Madison famously said,  
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps 
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who 
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives.298 
 
 
Public Responsibility 
 Our charge as the American public is to figure out how to wrest 
knowledge from the hands of our government. Our difficulty is identifying 
92
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
how we can make Madison’s cautionary advice real. It is, without doubt, an 
uphill and ongoing struggle, but the public is not on its own. 
As has been amply demonstrated throughout this article (and in the 
endnotes), the press is a powerful ally in ferreting out lies and engaging in 
investigative truth-telling. Especially now, they need our financial as well as 
our rhetorical and moral support. 
 Members of the press are not alone in calling out illegal, abusive, 
and/or fraudulent government practices. Often, their information comes 
from individuals inside the government, sometimes - but not often - 
information the agency has properly classified.299 Not everyone who works 
for the federal government has equivalent whistleblower protection, 
however; IC employees do, and IC contract employees now have some.300 
Indeed, a recent Senate Intelligence Committee report on the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 stated: 
The Committee remains concerned about the level of protection 
afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the level of insight 
congressional committees have into their disclosures. It is the 
Committee's expectation that all Offices of Inspector General across 
the IC will fully cooperate with the direction provided elsewhere in the 
bill to ensure both the Director of National Intelligence and the 
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the 
disclosures made to any IG about any National Intelligence Program 
funded activity.301 
 
As noted above, the Section 702 Reauthorization, Section 110, 
extends some whistleblower protections to IC contractor employees, who are 
about one-fourth of the greater IC workforce.302 Under Section 110, contract 
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employees are now protected to report wrongdoing, but enforcement 
mechanisms against retaliation are lacking in the bill itself: “The President 
shall provide for the enforcement of this subsection.” 
 
A Troubling Development 
In a troubling, and at this writing still unresolved, development, the IC 
whistleblower ombudsman, Dan Meyer, was barred in October 2017 from 
communicating with whistleblowers, which is the main responsibility of his 
job as the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and 
Source protection. The four-year-old program of outreach and training on 
proper disclosure and whistleblower protections for employees working with 
classified material is endangered. According to Foreign Policy: 
The intelligence community’s central watchdog is in danger of 
crumbling thanks to mismanagement, bureaucratic battles, clashes 
among big personalities, and sidelining of whistleblower outreach and 
training efforts, sources told FP. A strong whistleblowing outlet is 
needed as an alternative to leaking, and to protect employees from 
retaliation for reporting misconduct, proponents of the office argue. 
But many intelligence officials see outreach to their employees as an 
attempt to cultivate leakers or outside interference, rather than a 
secure, proper way to report potential violations of law.303 
 
The culture depicted here guarantees there will continue to be a need 
for organizations that vet the claims made by whistleblowers who are 
blocked and retaliated against internally, and work with them to get the 
identified problems appropriately addressed.304  
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Conclusion 
 As members of the public, we each have the responsibility to hold our 
Senators’ and our Representative’s respective feet to the fire. We have to be 
vigilant in meeting with them and in following them in the news - and not 
just their Twitter or Facebook feeds - to ascertain if they are working to 
protect both our First Amendment rights and our Fourth Amendment 
protections against the government, for example, “The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.” 
 This may seem a daunting task - and it is. A place to start is by 
looking to the experts who present testimony, send letters to Congress, and 
prepare analysis and commentaries.305 Two online publications - Just 
Security and Lawfare - among others, provide ongoing coverage of the 
issues raised in this article, as do the journalists cited (although they may 
well have moved to other venues).306,307 The problems have not gone away, 
and they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.308 
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